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This paper analyzes the Naval Quarantine of Cuba
undertaken by the United States Government in the "missile
crisis" of October-November | 1962, in order to determine the
legality of the quarantine and to draw conclusions as to the
permissibility, under international law, of the use or
threat of force in self-defense*
The official case made by the Government in support
of the legality of the quarantine is found to be insuffi-
cient legally to justify the quarantine. However, analysis
of traditional International law concerning the right of
self-defense is found to justify it, and the law of the UN
Charter is found not inconsistent with this right.
It is concluded that the traditional right of self-
defense must remain unimpaired as long as it is possible for
a nation to be confronted with a situation in which the
resort to, or threat of, force is the only course offering a
reasonable prospect of that nation's continued security.
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On the evening of October 22, 1962, President John F.
Kennedy told an expectant American television and radio
audience of the development in Cuba by the Soviet Union of
strategic bases for modern nuclear weapons systems* Sites
were under construction for medium-range ballistic missiles,
some of which were already on the island; construction had
been started on facilities for installation of intermediate-
range ballistic missiles; jet air bases were under construc-
tion} and bombers with the capability for carrying nuclear
2
weapons were already stationed on the island* Describing
the purpose of these bases as "none other than to provide a
nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere, *
the President announced that the united States Government
was taking a number of initial steps to meet the challenge
to the hemispheric security, including that of the institu-
tion of a "strict quarantine on all offensive military
equipment under shipment to Cuba." In the same address,
Text of the President *s address, White House press
release, Department of State Bulletin . XLVII (November 12,
1962), 715.








2the President announced that he was calling for an immediate
meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of
American States and for an emergency meeting of the United
Nations Security Council to consider the situation created
by the sudden build-up of offensive military weapons in Cuba
5by the Soviet Union.
On the following day, October 23, the Council of the
Organization of American States met in Washington as the
Provisional Organ of Consultation, found the Cuban Govern-
ment to have endangered the peace of the Americas, called
for the withdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba, and recom-
mended that O.A.S. members take measures, including use of
armed force, to prevent introduction of additional weapons
and to prevent those weapons already in Cuba from becoming
operational. Shortly after passage of the O.A.S. resolu-
tion, and formally on the basis of it, President Kennedy
7
signed an executive proclamation placing the quarantine
into effect as of 2:00 p.m., Greenwich time, on October 24.
The United States Ambassador to the United Nations,
5Ibid
., p. 718.
6Ibid., p. 722; see also Appendix B, infra , p. 114.
7
"Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons
to Cuba," Proclamation No. 3504, Federal Register , 27:10401;
reprinted in Department of State Bulletin , op. "cTt ., p. 717;
and The American Journal of International Law, LvTI (1963),
p. 512. See also Appendix A, infra, p. lflu\
m
on October 22, 1962, delivered to the President of the
Security Council a letter requesting an urgent meeting to
8deal with the Cuban situation. Mr. Stevenson presented the
United States position to the Security Council on the eve-
ning of October 23 and, during the course of his presents-
a
tion, read the operative paragraphs of the CAS resolution.
The United States had submitted a draft resolution for
Security Council consideration along with the request for
the Council meeting, but neither it nor a Soviet draft reso-
lution was pressed to a vote. The role of the United
Nations in helping resolve the crisis was limited to that of
the mediation efforts of the Secretary-General and of facili-
tating the public exposition of the views of the parties
12directly concerned and of other states. The quarantine
13
was ended on November 20, 1962, as the result primarily of
8State Department Press Release 636, Department of
State Bulletin , op * cit.
, p. 724.
9Department of State Bulletin , op . cit .. p. 723#
10Text in ibid ., p. 724.
^United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations . 1962
(New York: Columbia University Pres~l9$4 5 , pp. ioi-llT:
12For general discussions of U.N. activities during the
crisis, see UN Review . 9 (November, 1962), 6-17, 77-84; UN
Review . 9 ( December , 1962 ) , 1} and United Nations, op . cTE.
.
pp. 104-111.
13Announced at Presidential News Conference on
November 20. Department of State Bulletln .XLYII (December
i r%M u iq •
4agreement between the governments of the United States and
the Soviet Union providing for the withdrawal of offensive
weapons from Cuba and the halt in further introduction of
14
such weapons into Cuba.
As might have been expected, the reaction of Communist
bloc countries to the American defensive quarantine was out-
spoken. Cuba's request for an urgent Security Council
meeting proposed that the Council consider "the act of war
unilaterally committed by the Government of the United
ISStates in ordering the naval blockade of Cuba" and the
Soviet Union termed the quarantine a "violation of the
Charter of the United Nations and a threat to the peace on
the part of the United states of America" as well as "an
17
unprecedented violation of international law." The
Romanian delegate to the Security Council declared that
10, 1962), 874; proclaimed in Presidential Proclamation No.
3507 (November 21, 1962). Federal Register , 27:11525, re-
printed in Department of State Bulletin . klvil (December 17,
1962), 918.
14Terms of agreement in exchange of messages between
Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy, October 27-28,
1962, Department of State Bulletin , XLVII (November 12, 1962),
"Critical Situation in Caribbean Urgently Considered












5United states actions constituted not only a violation of
the rights of peoples to peace, freedom, and national inde-
pendence, but also a provocation that could push the world
18toward a nuclear war*
Criticism of the conduct of the united States was not
limited to that which emanated from Communist sources* The
delegate from the United Arab Republic stated that American
action was contrary to international law and the accepted
19
norms of freedom of the seas and the delegate from Ghana
questioned whether Cuba's receiving weapons from the Soviet
Union justified "naval blockade. " v
Although the action undertaken by the United States
was generally supported by governments of the Western democ-
racies, there was no lack of criticism from non-governmental
sources on the ground that the quarantine was illegal under
international law* A noted French writer, for example,
concluded that President Kennedy had placed security above
22the law* And a prominent American specialist in
IS
"Grave Concern with Situation <sflected in Council
Debate." UN Review . 9 (November, 1962), 16*
19Ibid * . p. 17. 2 Ibld *. p. 78.
21
Discussion of official Western reaction in Carl Q.
Christol and Charles R* Davis, "Maritime Quarantine i The
Naval Interdiction of Offensive Weapons and Associated
Materiel to Cuba, 1962. H The American Journal of Inter-
national Law
. 57 (1963), TOS" and 528.
22Raymond Aron, "International Law—Reality and
Fiction," New Republic, 147 (December 1, 1962), 13 and 14*

6international law, while conceding that the United States
acted with skill in obtaining removal of the weapons from
Cuba without hostilities or U.N, criticism, nevertheless
concluded that the quarantine was Illegal and that the epi-
sode had not "improved the reputation of the United States
as a champion of international law and [that] it may prove
23
an unfortunate precedent. . . ."
From a perspective wholly different from that of those
who criticised American conduct and those who defended it as
legal and proper in the circumstances, a former American
Secretary of State expressed the view that the "propriety of
24the Cuban quarantine is not a legal issue* " He added:
The power, position and prestige of the United States
had been challenged by another state; and law simply
cgsjs not deal with such questions of ultimate power-
power that comes close to the sources of sovereignty.
I cannot believe that there are principles of law that
say we must accept destruction of our way of life*
* • • No law can destroy the state creating the law.
The survival of states is not a matter of law. 25
The remarks of the former Secretary of State are,
doubtless, a bit extreme and this probably is due to the
23Quincy Wright , "The Cuban Quarantine , " The American
Journal of International Law , 57 (1963), 546 and""563*
24Opinion expressed by Dean Acheson at the 57» annual
meeting of the American Society of International Law,
Washington, D. C. t April 25, 1963, "Law and Conflict: Chang*
ing Patterns and Contemporary Challenges," Proceedings of
the American Society of International Law, 57 (1963), 1 and 15
25Ibid.
sk
7belief that criticism of the legal basis for the quarantine
rested on a proposition that international law requires a
nation to refrain from the use of force in international re*
lations to the point where its destruction, in certain cir-
cumstances, would be certain* Indeed, this would be the
case, as will be shown, if a restrictive interpretation of
the right of a state to use force in self-defense were ild
valid in contemporary law*
In any case, it seems obvious that the propriety of a
nation's conduct with respect to other states is clearly
subject to scrutiny and evaluation in terms of the laws
which regulate the conduct of states. This is all the more
obvious in a situation, such as the Cuban crisis, which in-
volves the threat to use military force to cause a modifica-
tion in the policies being pursued by other states
•
Situations of this nature are the things which have given
international law its greatest impetus, especially during
the Twentieth Century. The prevention and control of inter-
national conflict are the subject matter of the highest
political and legal priority in this era. Therefore, the
whole of the political and military measures taken during
the missile crisis was subject to the totality of inter-
national law.
What then is the international law which it has been
alleged that the United States was guilty of having violated

8What principle of law requires men to make a choice between
security and legality. What law leads men to applaud the
skill and effectiveness of a course of action taken by their
government—-while entertaining reservations as to its
legality: Certainly most objective opinion would regard the
international conduct of the United states in recent years
to have been generally non-aggressive. It would, therefore
,
be ironic if it should be found through dogmatic conclusions
that our government was an aggressor, an international of-
fender, against a nation which, by any reasonable standard,
has been consistently aggressive and was in its Cuban enter-
prise patently so* Such a finding would be extremely unwise,
unless there is a clear, compelling case for it*
The primary reason for disagreement as to the answer
to the question of the legality of the Cuban quarantine is
the differing concepts of the right of a state to take for-
cible measures against another state. More specifically, it
is a question of the right of a state to use or threaten
force In its self-defense in situations not involving actual
armed attack by an adversary. The Cuban quarantine provided
a good Illustration of the uncertainty as to precisely what
international law is on this subject. Furthermore, it
clearly demonstrated the necessity for recognition of a
realistic doctrine of self-defense which is compatible both
with the legitimate interest of states in their own defense
I
9and with the uncompleted task of the institutionalized regu-
lation of force within the international system* Finally,
the Cuban crisis provided a useful illustration of the role




THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT » S CASE
FOR THE QUARANTINE
The official attitude of the United States Government
toward the question of the legality of the Cuban quarantine
admitted that the situation created by the Soviet introduc-
tion of offensive weapons into Cuba was unprecedented and
that there was no clearly prescribed and carefully deline-
ated set of procedures available for dealing with this novel
situation. This uncertainty was attributed by the Deputy
Legal Advisor of the State Department to changing concepts
of international law which he described as the product of
"new circumstances and the response to new conditions in the
2international environment." In spite of the novelty and
difficulty of the situation, the Government's intention was
that the actions taken rest on the "soundest foundations in
law and . • . appear in that light to all the world* . • ."
While it was later admitted that progress in alleviating the
situation could not, on the whole, have been attributed to
Leonard C. Meeker, "Defensive Quarantine and the






the legal position of the United States, the question of
legality of actions taken and contemplated was apparently
kept in the forefront of State Department thinking.
While the Government might have rested its case for
the quarantine on a number of approaches, that chosen was
the right of maintaining international peace and security
through regional organizations, in accordance with Article
52(1) of the United Nations Charter* Although it has not
been the position of the United States that this is the only
basis on which the legality of the quarantine could have
been sustained, the Government has not formally employed
other justifications*
Traditional International Law
The term "quarantine*1 was applied to the interdiction
of offensive weapons and associated material bound for Cuba
in an apparent attempt to avoid, insofar as possible, the
implication that the United States was undertaking a bellig-
erent measure* The similarity of the quarantine with many
4Abram Chayes, Legal Advisor, Department of State,
"The Legal Case for U* S« Action on Cuba," address before
the Tenth Reunion of the Harvard Law School Class of 1952 in
Boston, Massachusetts, November 3, 1962, in Department of
State Bulletin . XLVII (November 19, 1962), >$3.
5The American Journal of International Law Supple**






aspects of a blockade was admitted, but the Government was
careful to avoid use of the term "blockade" and consistently
referred to the interdiction as a "defensive quarantine."
In international law, a traditional blockade requires a
7
state of war | the U. 5. Government made every effort to
show that what it was carrying out was not an act of war*
The President in his radio and television speech on October
22, 1962, first publicly characterised the action as a
9
"strict quarantine." "There was no assertion of a state of
war or belligerency."
There is also the device of so-called "pacific
blockade" which, although used on numerous occasions since
the beginning of the Nineteenth Century by large states
against small, has had at best an uncertain status in inter-
national law and has frequently been challenged as illegal
by some states-—notably the United States. The United
States has denied that such a blockade can be applied
Abram Chayes, "Law and the Quarantine of Cuba,"
Foreign Affairs . 41 (April, 1963), 550 and 551.
7Herbert w. Briggs (ed*), The Law of Nations (second
edition} New York: Appleton-Century~Crof"Es, Inc., 1952),
p. 991.
Text in Department of State Bulletin , XLVII
(November 12, 1952;, 715.
Ibid., p. 716. l Meeker, loc . clt .




against a third state. As the quarantine was a selected
12interdiction directed against a third, it would have been,
at the very least, an inconsistency had it been justified by
the United States as a pacific blockade. The United States
13did not rest its case on such grounds and avoided use of
the term in official statements on the subject of the quar-
antine.
Although public pronouncements concerning the Cuban
situation were studded with clear implications that the
United States response was motivated by considerations of
national and regional self-defense, the Government did not
make a claim that it was reacting in necessary self-defense
under the traditional rules of international law. For in-
stance, President Kennedy, in his address of October 22,
characterized the steps to be taken as "in the defense of
14
our own security and of the entire western hemisphere."
However, the Legal Advisor to the State Department later
pointed out that "neither the President in his speech nor
12Text of the President's proclamation entitled,
"Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba,"
Proclamation No. 3504, Federal Register , 27:10401. Re-
printed in Department of State Bulletin , XLVII (November 12,
1962), 717, and The American Journal of International Law , 57
(1963), 512. See also Appendix A, infra
, p. 110.
13Meeker, loc . cit .
14




the O.A.s. in its resolution invoked article 51 [of the U.N.
15
Charter].'* A discussion of the motivative force of con-
16
siderations of self-defense and an analysis of the quaran-
17tine in terms of the law relating to self-defense are
presented at a later point in this paper.
The Organisation of American States
In his radio and television speech of October 22,
President Kennedy announced that the United States was call-
ing for an immediate meeting of the c*.gan of Consultation of
the Organisation of American States to consider the situa-
tion created by the Soviet weapons build-up in Cuba. On the
following day, the Council of the OAS met in Washington and
constituted Itself as the Provisional Organ of Consultation
in accordance with the procedures prescribed in the Inter-
18American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty). It
considered the evidence of the Soviet build-up of offensive
weapons in Cuba and determined that
Incontrovertible evidence has appeared that the
Government of Cuba, despite repeated warnings, has




Infra , pp. 29-32. Infra . Chapter IV.
18United Nations, Treaty Series , Vol. XXI (New York:
United Nations, 1948), pp. 9^-115. Article 12 provides that
the Governing Body (Ambassadors to the OAS) "may act pro-
visionally as an organ of consultation until the meeting of





secretly endangered the peace of the Continent by
permitting the Sino-Soviet powers to have inter-
mediate and middle-range missiles on its territory
capable of carrying nuclear warheads, 19
The Organ then resolved to call for the "immediate disman-
tling and withdrawal" of the offensive weapons from Cuba and
2. To recommend that the member states, in accord-
ance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures,
individually and collectively, including the use of
armed forces, which they may deem necessary to ensure
that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to re-
ceive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material
and related supplies which may threaten the peace and
security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles
in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming
an active threat to the peace and security of the
Continent. 2
It was on this OAS resolution and the Rio Treaty that
the United States Government based its official case for the
legality of the Cuban quarantine. "It was the conclusion of
the United States Government that this treaty and the resolu-
tion of October 23, 1962, clearly authorized the defensive
21quarantine of Cuba." It was also observed, with respect
to the validity of the action as against Cuba, that the Rio
Treaty binds all the American Republics, including Cuba, and
that thus there was a consensual basis in treaty between the
19
Text of OAS resolution adopted October 23, 1962.
Department of State Bulletin ,XLVII (November 12, 1962), 722
and 723. See also Appendix B, infra
, p. 114.
20Ibid.






22United States and Cuba for the quarantine • It is obvi-
ously quite a different matter to defend the legal validity
of the quarantine with respect to its application against
the Soviet Union* The State Department's position was that
since the Rio Treaty established a regional organization for
maintaining peace and security, the purposes and activities
of which are in conformity with the U» N* Charter, other
countries, such as the Soviet Union, were in no position to
23
attack the organization's activities within the region.
It has elsewhere been claimed that the application of the
quarantine against the Soviet Union can be justified on the
basis that the U.S.S.R. shared in Cuba's offense against the
24inter-American community as an accomplice* Interesting as
these preferred justifications are, it is difficult to
accept the proposition that the quarantine could legally
have been made applicable against the Soviet Union, or any
other third state, purely on the basis of a decision made by
a regional organisation, of which they were not members,
unless other grounds existed which justified application of
coercion against them. It Is a principle "sustained by
22Ibid. 2 3Ibid *. p. 518*
24Charles 9« Fenwick, "The Quarantine Against Cuba:
Legal or Illegal ," The American Journal of International




25doctrine, jurisprudence, and the practice of States" that
a state is not legally bound by the provisions of a treaty
which it has not accepted* Since the Soviet Union had not
accepted the Rio Treaty, it was not binding on the U*S*S*R*
Its application against activities of the U.S*S.R* would
have to be justified on other legal grounds if the quaran-
tine is to be defended as legitimate*
The Rio Treaty was concluded by the American Repub-
lics in order to
assure peace, through adequate means, to provide for
effective reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks
against any American State, and in order to deal with
threats of aggression against any of them* 26
Therefore, by its own provisions it is authorised to take
action against "armed attack" and against "threats of aggres-
sion*" Article 3 of the Treaty provides for response to
armed attack "by any State against an American State," but
the resolution of October 23 was not taken under this
authority since only the most expansive interpretation of
"armed attack" would have justified interpreting the Soviet
military build-up in Cuba as a constructive armed attack*
The OAS resolution was warranted, from the standpoint
of the Rio Treaty, by Article 6 which authorises the taking
of measures in assistance to a victim of aggression, and for
25





the common defense, or for the maintenance of continental
peace and security in situations involving "an aggression
which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or
intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situa-
tion that might endanger the peace of America." The quaran-
tine was a legitimate measure, insofar as the Rio Treaty is
concerned, since the use of armed force is one measure au-
thorised by Article 8 of the Treaty for application by the
Organ of Consultation of the GAS. The passage of the
October 23 resolution was legally undertaken by more than
27the required two-thirds vote of signatory states.
It Is interesting to review, at this point, the chro-
nology of the events leading to the institution of the
quarantine. The President of the United States announced in
his speech on the evening of October 22 that a "strict quar-
28
antine" would be taken as an "initial step," to secure the
removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. I resolution of
the OAS was passed on the following day, and it subsequently
became this resolution upon which the U. s. Government based
27The vote in the Council was nineteen to nothing
with one abstention. Uruguay* s delegate abstained on
October 23 because of not having received instructions from
his government, but on October 24 cast an affirmative vote*
Department of State Bulletin , XLVII (November 12, 1962), 716.




the legal defense of the quarantine. Therefore, although
the Presidential Proclamation of the quarantine was formally
issued after the OAS action and was scheduled to go into
29force at 2:00 p.m. (Greenwich time) on October 24, the
U. S. Government was clearly committed to a course of action
which it would undoubtedly have pursued regardless of what
action the OAS had taken* The Organ of Consultation of the
OAS, therefore, really had only a choice of giving or with-
holding authorization of an action which would have been
carried out in any event. This does not mean, however, that
the OAS action was any the less reflective of the true feel-
ings of the American governments. The Latin American repub-
lics have a long history of distrust for United States
policy in the Americas and a strong reluctance to permit
United States "intervention" in any other American state.
It could hardly be supposed that they would have condoned
unilateral United States intervention in Cuban affairs had
they not sincerely felt it justified by circumstances and
authorized under the Rio Treaty. It seems more likely that
the OAS action came as a result of the realization of a
serious threat to the hemisphere and of the strong, deter-
mined leadership of the United States. Regardless of what-
ever may have been the intention of the U. S. Government had






the OAS not approved the course of action it did authorise
»
it must be admitted that united States action in implement-
ing the quarantine was carried out formally in pursuance to
the Consultative Organ's resolution of October 23.
Charter of the United Nations
The justification of the legality of the quarantine
advanced by the United States Government, based as it is on
the rights of the Organisation of American States in main—
taining international peace and security, must, of course,
be subjected to analysis from the viewpoint of the law of
the Charter of the United Nations*
Chapter VIII of the Charter specifically recognises
regional organizations as instrumentalities for dealing with
regional subjects related to international peace and
security provided that such organisations and their activi-
30ties are consistent with U. N. purposes and princ pies.
The Charter goes so far as to encourage resort to such
regional bodies prior to referral of local disputes to the
31Security Council and to enjoin the Security Council to
encourage the development of pacific settlement of local
disputes through such instrumentalities either on applica-
tion by states concerned or by reference from the Security
30Article 52(1). 31Article 52(2).
q£ MSft >- '••'• • : '
'
21
32Council itself. However, the Charter also prescribes
important restrictions on the manner in which regional
organizations may take enforcement action. The Security
Council is encouraged to utilize regional arrangements for
enforcement action, but, except for measures against the
former World War II Axis Powers, regional organizations are
prohibited from taking enforcement action without authoriza-
33tion of the Security Council, In addition, action taken
or contemplated by regional organizations for maintenance of
international peace and security is required to be reported
34to the Security Council.
With respect to the requirement for keeping the
Security Council informed of action being undertaken, the
Organization of American States acted properly by providing
in its October 23 resolution for informing the Security
35Council of the action authorized. Similarly, on the pre-
ceding day, the United States had called for an emergency
36
meeting of the Security Council to consi situation.
United States Government spokesmen have broadly de-
fended the legality of the quarantine under the law of the
32Article 52(3). 33Article 53(1). 34Article 54.
35Appendix B, infra, p. 114.




Charter as an action taken by a regional arrangement which
is consistent with the "Purposes and Principles of the
37United Nations • " Reference has been made to the influence
of the Act of Chapultepec in the writing of those portions
of the Charter dealing with regional organisations, the
assertion that the Act was consistent with the Charter being
written at San Francisco, and the fact that the exact lan-
guage of the Act was incorporated into the Rio Treaty of
381947. However, it is important to draw a clear distinc-
tion between an organisation, in itself consistent with U. N.
purposes and principles, and an action taken by that organi-
sation. The fact that the QA3 is intrinsically consistent
with U. N. purposes and principles does not guarantee that
each of its acts is consistent with, and legal under, the
law of the Charter.
The most serious shortcoming in the U. S. Govern-
ment's case would seem to lie in the difficulty of squaring
CAS action with Article 53(1) of the - ms» This article
provides, in part, that "no enforcement action shall be
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies
37Article 52(1). For discussion of this broad aspect,
see Chayes, "The Legal Case for U. S. Action on Cuba," op .
cit
• , p. 764; Chayes, "Law and the Quarantine of Cuba," op .
cit . t p. 555| and Meeker, op . cit . . pp. 518-519.
38Meeker, o£. cit . . pp. 518-519; and Chayes, "Law




without the authorisation of the Security Council . . .
[except against former Axis Powers].*' The Government *s case
has been based on an interpretation of the OAS action as not
constituting "enforcement action 1 ' since it was not obliga-
39tory on all OAS members* Apparently desiring to backstop
this proposition, State Department officials have further
claimed that Security Council authorisation need not be
40 41prior authorisation or even express authorisation.
The Interpretation of "enforcement action" as exclud-
ing recommendatory action not having the force of obligation
on OAS members is taken by analogy from precedents estab-
lished within tie United Nations Organisation. In the U. N.
the distinction is made between Security Council measures
which are obligatory on all members , taken on the one hand
as properly constituting "enforcement action," and measures
only recommended by either the Security Council or the
General Assembly, on the other hand. The latter are not
considered "enforcement" measures. This distinction has
been upheld by the International Court of Justice in the
39Meeker, oj>. cit.
, pp. 520-522; and Chayes, "Law
and the Quarantine of Cuba," o£. cit.
,
p. 556.
40Meeker, op . cit ., p. 520$ and Chayes, "Law and the
Quarantine of Cuba," op . cit ., p. 556.
41Meeker, op . cit . t p. 522 | and Chayes, "Law and the











case on Certain Expenses of the United Nations in which it
was held that measures taken by the Assembly and the Secu-
rity Council in the Suez and the Congo were not enforcement
action" since they were only measures recommended to par-
42ticipating states. The Court stated specifically that
• action' must mean such action as is solely within the
province of the Security Council. It cannot refer to recom-
43
mendations which the Security Council might make. ..."
Thus, since "enforcement action" is considered in
U. N. parlance as not including action taken by a U. N. body
which is only recommendatory on members, the term "enforce-
ment action" in Article 53(1) necessarily excludes action
taken by regional organizations which is not obligatory on
all members of those organizations. Therefore, the reason-
ing goes, recommendatory action by regional organizations
does not fall within that category of action for which Secu-
rity Council authorization is required. The resolution
adopted on October 23, 1962, by the Consultative Organ of
the OAS merely recommended that member states "take all
measures , . • • including the use of armed force • • • " to
stop the weapons build-up in Cuba. Therefore, it is
42International Court of Justice , Reports of Judg-
ments , Advisory Opinions and Orders , 1962 (Leyden, Holland:





possible following this line of reasoning, to conclude that
the resolution recommending quarantine "should not be held
to constitute 'enforcement action' under Article 53(1) re-
44quiring Security Council authorisation."
But this reasoning is not entirely convincing* In
the first place, it is less than certain that the Inter-
national Court of Justice would have held that the sane dis-
tinction made between "enforcement action M and recommended
action taken at the behest of a u. N. organ must necessarily
apply in the case of similar action by a regional organisa-
tion* Furthermore, the question which the Court resolved
was framed in the perspective of budgetary matters and only
by uncertain inference is it analogous to questions of the
legality of the use of force by a regional organisation on a
claim of maintaining peace and security* From the point of
view of what must have been the intent of Article 53(1), it
would seem to be of little relevance whether a regional
action was obligatory on members or merely recommendatory*
The clear intent of Article 53(1) was to subordinate the
right of regional organisations to take forcible action to
the primary authority of the Security Council in keeping the
peace* The results would most likely be the same whether a
regional organisation made its action obligatory on members
44Meeker, op * clt *. p. 522*
•
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or only voluntary} if it had the votes to make action obliga-
tory, it would certainly have the votes to recommend it*
Why should a regional organization be allowed an escape from
Charter requirements merely by using the word "recommends "
.
There is certainly little prospect that recommended action
would necessarily be more nearly consistent with U* N. pur-
pos .-* and principles than would obligatory action* Either
would be equally open to abuse* It thus appears that the
CAS action in authorizing the Cuban quarantine was not valid
legally as an action upholding international peace and secu-
rity by reason of the lack of Security Council authorization*
Its validity must be supported on some other grounds*
Nor are the precedents advanced supporting the con-
tentions that Security Council authorization n^ed not be
either prior or express any more convincing* These conten-
tions have been advanced apparently to serve as a back-up to
the previously discussed argument that Securi Council
authorization was not required in the first place* It must
be observed, however, that the U* 5* Government's case did
not depend on these precedents since its claim that Secu-
rity Council approval was unnecessary would have made them
irrelevant* To support the suggestion that authorization






1960 precedent. In that situation, the Soviet Union asked
the Security Council to give retroactive approval to diplo-
matic and economic sanctions voted by the American Foreign
Ministers against the Dominican Republic* It is interest-
ing to note, however, that the Security Council did not take
formal action to that effect but only took note of the gas
47
action. Reference has been made to the precedent set
within the Security Council of not considering abstentions
and absences from Council voting as depriving the Council of
"the concurring votes of the permanent members** in the adop-
48tion of resolutions. This precedent has been said to
constitute the basis for assuming that Security Council
authorization can km implied* The Council's failure to act
on a Soviet resolution condemning the quarantine has thus
49been interpreted in this way. It is Important to distin-
guish these precedents as being political actions and as not
of juridical character. The Security Council is primarily a
political organ, and its precedents cannot be tak n as neces-
sarily establishing rules having legal validity. To infer





"Security Ccuncil Takes Note of Decision of Organi-
zation of American States," UN Review , 7 (November, 1960),
68 and 88.
Meeker, o£. cit • , 522. 49Ibld .
t
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disinclination or inability to reach any decision on a ques-
tion of action taken by a regional organisation would be
very nearly to deprive Article 53(1) of any practical effect.
Carried to its ultimate extreme, such an interpretation of
Security Council approval would support the contention that
in a situation where one permanent member "vetoed" a Secu-
rity Council resolution condemning regional action, the
situation would constitute tacit, retroactive approval of
that regional action undertaken, even if ten Security Coun-
cil members had joined in voting for the condemning resolu-
tion* The "plain and natural meaning" of the words of
Article 53(1) do not permit such an interpretation. Rather,
they clearly imply that in order for a regional organisation
to take forcible measures to maintain international peace
and security, it must be first authorised to do so by the
Security Council*
Therefore, the net effect of the Government *s case,
based on a claim that the GAS action did not constitute
"enforcement action" and that, even if it did, Security
Council approval of such action need not have been explicit
or prior, is less than satisfactory* The applicable Charter
provisions B94oxl too clearly to dictate the opposite con-
clusions—that action of the type undertaken by the DAS does
amount to the same thing as enforcement action and that




Security Council* If the quarantine is to be upheld as
valid under international law, it must be supported on
grounds other than those contained in Chapter VTXX of the
U. N. Charter*
Self-Defense
While the United States Government has not defended
the legal validity of the quarantine on a claim of necessary
self^-defense, it was obviously motivated in reacting to the
Cuban situation by concern that the peace and security of
the united States, as well as of the rest of the hemisphere,
were endangered by the introduction of offensive weapons
into Cuba* In his radio and television speech of October
22, President Kennedy referred to the transformation of Cuba
into a strategic base as "an explicit threat to the peace
50
and security of all the Americas'1 and as adding to "an
51
already clear and present danger*" The urgency of the
threat was illustrated by his statement that modern weapons
are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so
swift that any substantially increased possibility
of their use or any sudden change in their deploy-




He concluded that the "greatest danger of all would be to do
50
Department of State Bulletin, XLVII (November 12,
1962), 7lTT




nothing." Regardless of what was subsequently to become
the Governments legal justification for the quarantine, the
President was obviously speaking in reaction to what he must
have considered as a danger urgent enough to require re*
sponse which could only be in the nature of anticipatory
self-defense.
The United States request for an emergency meeting of
the Security Council referred to the "determination of the
countries of the western hemisphere* * • to safeguard and
defend the peace and security of the region against external
54interference and aggression. . • ." Before the Council of
the Organisation of American States on October 23, Secretary
of State Dean Rusk expressed the belief that "no nation of
this hemisphere can feel secure from direct attack or from
55persistent blackmail," urged the Council that it must "act
in defense of our national independence and democratic
56heritage," and asserted that the American republics had
"the primary responsibility and duty to act as we are now
57doing as a hemisphere."
53Ibld .. p. 719.
54Press Release 636, Department of state Bulletin »
XLVTI (November 12, 1962), 17C
55Press Release 640, Department of State Bulletin
.
XLVII (November 12, 1962), 7"20 and 721.
56Ibld. 57Ibld.. p. 722.
.
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The OAS resolution adopted on October 23 quoted the
resolution adopted by the hemispheric foreign ministers at
Punta del Este in January, 1962, in which it was urged that
member states "take those steps that they may consider
appropriate and for their individual and collective self-
defense • • . " and "cooperate ... to strengthen their
capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, sub-
version, or other dangers to peace and security. ..."
The Presidential Proclamation which was based on the OAS
resolution and which ordered the quarantine into effect did
59
so in order "to defend the security of the United States.
The Legal Advisor to the Department of State subse-




" but also pointed out that "the Presi-
dent in his speech did not invoke article 51 or the right of
self-defense," and that the OAS acted under Article 6, not
Article 3 (self-defense in case of armed attack) of the Rio
Treaty. 61
CO
Department of State Bulletin , XLVTI (November 12,
1962), 722. See also Appendix B, infra
, p. 114.
59
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Therefore, the United States Government and, as well,
the Organization of American states, by their actions and
words appear clearly to have been reacting to the threat in
the manner of self-defense and with all but the formally
invoked claim of necessary self-defense* Since the validity
of the case made by the U« S« Government in support of the
legality of the quarantine has not been accepted as valid,
it will be necessary to analyse it in the context of the
international law of self-defense.

CHAPTER III
ALTERNATIVES FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
There are in International law and in the practice of
states several methods for adjustment of international dis-
putes through peaceful means. Indeed, the United Nations
Charter obligates members who are parties to a dispute, "the
continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance
of international peace and security, to seek first a solu-
tion by "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agen-
cies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own
choice." Furthermore, members are authorized to bring dis-
putes, or situations which might lead to international
friction or give rise to a dispute, to the U. N. Security
2Council or the General Assembly and are obligated to bring
to the attention of the Security Council disputes which have
3failed of settlement through peaceful means. It might,
therefore, be assumed that the United States Government
could have, or should have, attempted to seek settlement of
the Cuban crisis through one or more of these procedures
before resorting to the measures of a naval quarantine.




It should be observed initially, however, that the
situation in Cuba in October, 1962, hardly constituted a
"dispute" or a "situation which night lead to international
friction or give rise to a dispute." To characterise it
simply as such would be a gross oversimplification. A dis-
pute most assuredly did exist—and had existed between the
United States and Cuba, in one form or another, for many
months—but it was not merely a matter of one which was
"likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace
and security. " International peace and security, especially
that of the United States and the other American republics,
had already been endangered through the conduct of Cuba and
the Soviet Union* Nevertheless, the clear overall intent of
the U. N. Charter is to limit unilateral resort to force as
a means of settling international differences, and the
Charter contains elsewhere a specific blanket obligation on
4
members to settle international disputes by peaceful means.
Therefore, it is necessary to assess the propriety of the
imposition of a naval quarantine in the context of this ob-
ligation for the use of peaceful means of settlement.
An essential element in the consideration of peaceful
alternatives available for the possible settlement of the







situation, for the urgency involved was a critical factor in
the feasibility of peaceful alternatives and in the neces-
sity for forcible measures of self-defense* Indeed, a suf-
ficiently high degree of urgency, in any given situation of
the nature of the missile crisis, could preclude the resort
to peaceful alternatives and dictate a decision to resort to
force in necessary self-defense* Any degree of urgency less
than virtually the absolute would require weighing it against
the prospects for Just settlement without further compromis-
ing the security of the threatened state*
The Urgency of the Threat
The world may never know precisely the degree of
urgency involved in the Cuban weapons build-up, or even the
U* 5* Government's assessment of that urgency, but it is
possible to draw some important Inferences which help
clarify the situation, especially in relation to its impact
on American thinking*
Public statements made by u. S. public officials
offer one important source of information as to the urgency
with which the situation was viewed by the Government*
While it is admitted that such statements give only one side
of the picture and are obviously subject to inaccuracies and
exaggeration, they are, nonetheless, important as indicators
of the Government's assessment of the nature of the threat







independent of an objective determination of the precise
degree of urgency, if such were possible—for the reason
that the reaction of the United States could only have been
based on it. Moreover, it is significant that the Soviet
Union never disputed the U. S. Government's claims of
urgency insofar as they stated the nature of the weapons in
the build-up and the progress being made in completing their
installation. Soviet denials were, of course, made as to
the offensive nature of the weapons involved,
President Kennedy spoke of the "urgent transformation
5
of Cuba into an important strategic base," characterized
the missiles in Cuba as adding to "an already clear and
present danger," and described the "secret, swift, and extra-
ordinary buildup of Communist missiles—in an area well known
to have a special and historical relationship to the United
States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere" as unac-
7
ceptable to the United States, Secretary of State Dean
Rusk declared that the "immediate character of the nuclear
military threat" was such that the American republics could
not "tolerate any further opportunity to add to their [the
5Television and radio address of October 22, 1962,








bases In Cuba] capacity* • • • " He expressed conviction
that the evidence left "no doubt that the danger is present
a
and real" and referred to the "urgency of the situation.
"
A White House statement issued on October 26 re-
ported that the development of missile sites in Cuba was
continuing at a "rapid pace" and that activity at the sites
was apparently directed at achieving "a full operational
capability as soon as possible." It was further stated that
missiles previously parked in the open had since b&&n moved
to new positions and that cabling had been sighted running
11from missile-ready tents to nearby generators. This
latter information would seem to indicate that the missiles
were nearing operational status.
The foregoing statements made by officials of the U.
S. Government show clearly that the official public position
of the Government was that the threat raised by the rapid
construction of offensive weapons facilities in Cuba was
extremely urgent. There is no evidence that this official
position did not accurately reflect the Government's private
assessment of the urgency*
Statement before the Council of the GAS, October 23,
1962, Department of State Bulletin , op . cit * , p. 721.
9Ibld .
10Press Release dated October 26, 1962, Department of








The very nature of the weapons being installed, in
the circumstances of the hurried construction of their bases
and sites, constituted a threat of considerable urgency* It
is hard to escape the conclusion reached by the President in
his speech of October 22 that their purpose was "none other
than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the
12Western Hemisphere." The official view of the Soviet
13Union that their purpose was defensive is hard to accept.
The claim that medium and intermediate range ballistic mis-
siles and jet bombers could have been stationed in Cuba as a
14deterrent against possible U. 5. attacks on Cuba is also
unconvincing* While it is admitted that the defensive or
offensive nature of weapons is often a matter of the use to
which they are actually put rather than an instrinsic
quality, it is, nevertheless, true that reasonable prelimi-
nary assumptions can usually be drawn in the case of some
particular weapons* This is certainly true in the case of
12Department of State Bulletin , op * cit., p. 715.
Soviet letter to the President of the Security
Council on October 23, 1962, UN Document S/5186, cited in
United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations . 1962 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 104 and 111.
See also Chairman Khrushchev's message to the President on
October 27, Department of State Bulletin, op. cit ., pp. 742
and 743. '
14Quincy Wright, "The Cuban Quarantine," The American




nuclear weapons systems of mass destructive power. The
final conclusion obviously depends on circumstances* In the
circumstances of October, 1962. it is difficult to see that
this type of weapon, capable of and suitable only for the
sudden destruction of virtually all major cities of the
Western hemisphere, was necessary for the defense of Cuba.
The area into which the Soviet Union was moving its
nuclear weapons is one which has since the formulation of
the Monroe Doctrine held a particular interest for the
United States—an interest which has been shared by the
other American republics for its importance to hemispheric
15
security. There was no legitimate reason for Soviet ex-
pansion into this area, with the possible exception of
defense of the Castro Government in Cuba, a reason which
would not, however, have justified the installation of offen-
sive nuclear weapons* Moreover, the facilities in Cuba
would have bypassed American early warning systems for the
16detection of incoming missiles, thus greatly reducing
15President Kennedy noted this special relationship
in his speech of October 22, supra , p. 36. More recent mani-
festations of the Inter-American concern for the security of
the region were shown in the resolutions adopted by the
Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OAS in 1960 con-
demning intervention by an extra-continental power in the
hemisphere—Department of State Bulletin, XLIII (September
12, 1960), 40">—and by "Ene fiignth Meeting declaring that com-
munist governments endangered continued unity and democratic
institutions, The American Journal of International Law , 56
(1962) , 601 anTToTI




American defensive capability against possible missile and
bomber attack. The seriousness of this possibility and the
urgency in preventing its accomplishment are made apparent
by the realisation that only a few days' delay in taking
appropriate measures would have resulted in the missiles
17being in place and operational, the situation irreversible*
Evaluation of Procedures Available
Of the peaceful means for settling international dis-
putes mentioned in the U. N. Charter, one may be dismissed
as virtually irrelevant. That is the alternative of resort
to regional agencies or arrangements. Although the Cuban
quarantine was based on OAS action, this action was not in
the nature of peaceful settlement. Nor was the situation
one which wouli have been appropriate for regional action
along lines of pacific settlement since the Soviet Union, a
party to the situation, was not a member of the OAS and Cuba
was not at the time a participant in OAS activities*
S*lf-Daf*nB& t " The American Journal of International Law, 57
(1963), 597 itfTSGll
1 7Ibid . 1 p. 602.
18The Castro Government of Cuba, but not the country
itself, was excluded from participation in the Organisation
of American States by the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers
of the OAS at Punta del Este, January 22-31, 1962, The





Prior to October 22, 1962, the Government of the
United States had attempted through the peaceful alternative
of negotiation to prevent the situation in Cuba from becom-
ing a situation or dispute likely to endanger peace and
security* These negotiations were carried on with the
Soviet Union since the United States did not at that time
19have diplomatic relations with Cuba and since it was in
reality only the Soviet Union which could have transformed
Cuba into a really urgent nuclear threat to the Western
Hemisphere* These conversations with the Soviet Union made
it clear to the USSR that the United States could not toler-
20
ate the presence of offensive weapons in Cuba* Moreover t
the Soviet Union had publicly stated that the "armaments and
military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for
defensive purposes . . . " and that the USSR had no need "to
shift its weapons for a retaliatory blow to any other coun-
21try, for instance Cuba* * * •" The false Soviet
19Relations were broken on January 3, 1961, Depart-
ment of State Bulletin . XLT7 (January 23, 1961), 103.
20President Kennedy publicly warned the Soviet Union
on September 4 and 13, 1962, in respect to this* statements
by President Kennedy, September 4 and 13, Department of
State Bulletin . XLVII (September 24, 1962). 450; ibid *
(October l, 1962), 481* In his speech of October 22, the
President referred to these public warnings and character-
ized the Soviet build-up in Cuba as in "flagrant and delib-
erate defiance of • • • [among other things] my own public
warnings * . *," ibid * (November 12, 1962), 715.
21Quoted by President Kennedy in address of October
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assurances of the defensive nature of its weapons build-up
in Cuba were reiterated to President Kennedy personally by
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko just days before the crisis
reached a climax. Mr* Gromyko told the President that
Soviet assistance to Cuba "pursued solely the purpose of
contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba" and that
"if [Soviet assistance in training Cubans in handling defen-
sive armaments] were otherwise, the Soviet Union would never
22become involved in rendering such assistance." Soviet
spokesmen continued to deny in the Security Council the
offensive character of the weapons in Cuba even after their
23intrinsically offensive nature was made public. Thus, the
United States had attempted to find a solution to the
developing situation through negotiation, but had been un-
able to do so in spite of Soviet assurances to the contrary.
The duplicity of the Soviet Union in its negotiations
with the United States has a particular relevance to the






"Critical Situation in Caribbean Urgently Considered
by Security Council," UN Review , 9 (November, 1962), 6;
"Council Adjourns Caribbean Debate for Negotiations," ibid.,
pp. 8 and 10. Khrushchev still insisted that the weapons
were designed "to strengthen its [Cuba's] defensive poten-
tial" in his message to President Kennedy on October 27,





•valuation of the prospects for success offered by other
peaceful means for settlement of the situation for two rea-
sons. In the first place, the obvious insincerity of the
Soviets would have reasonably justified a presumption that
equal insincerity would have accompanied any offer or
response on the part of the USSR to seek a solution through
other means* Second, the clandestine nature of the build-up
of weapons in Cuba, nowhere more forcefully Illustrated than
in the false Soviet assurances that only defensive armaments
were being installed in Cuba, greatly added to the justifi-
cation for an assumption on the part of the U. 3. Government
that the urgency of the situation necessitated prompt and
forceful response. President Kennedy obviously appreciated
the importance of this implication when, after pointing out
that the United States had never stationed strategic mis-
siles in another country
under a cloak of secrecy and deception, [he declared
that the] secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup of
Communist missiles • • • is a deliberately provocative
and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot
be accepted* • • . w2*
Thus, the U. 3. Government had attempted to find a
solution to the situation in Cuba through the peaceful means
of direct negotiations with the Soviet Union, but these
24Speech of October 22, 1962, department of State





prior to the imposition of naval
quarantine, due to the fact that the Soviet Union refused to
desist from activities to which the United States strongly
objected* Soviet refusal to desist from the weapons build-up
was. moreover, accompanied by denials that it was taking
place at all* Had the United states sought a solution to
the situation through other peaceful means of mutual consent,
there is the strong presumption, from prior Soviet dishon-
esty and secrecy, that no meaningful solution would have
been expected* Add to this low degree of expectation for
acceptable solution to the situation the urgency of the
threat implicit in the weapons build-up and one must con-
clude that there was no reasonable alternative in the proce-
dures for pacific settlement* Even had the Soviet Union
given lip service to agreement for use of any one of these
procedures, it would B^mn most likely that the weapons
build-up would have continued at its accelerated pace and
that the weapons would likely have become operational before
any peaceful means of settlement had run its course* In
this respect, it is pertinent to note that, even for a time
after the quarantine was proclaimed, urgent work toward
making the missile sites operational continued* A halt in





the weapons were brought about only after it was apparent
that the United States had sufficient military power and had
the determination to use it in order to secure removal of
the threat in Cuba* Had the U* S. Government relied exclu-
sively on pacific means of settlement, the inference is
inescapable that it would have been confronted with the fait
accompli of operational nuclear weapons systems installed in
Cuba.
The eventual resolution of the missile crisis was ac-
complished through direct negotiation between the President
and Chairman Khrushchev, with the mediatory efforts of U* If.
26Secretary-General U Thant and without serious military
action, but it must be kept in mind that this negotiated
settlement was possible only after the threat of military
force dictated a decision on the part of the Soviet Union to
withdraw its offensive weapons* One cannot be sure what
would have been the outcome had military force not been
used, but Soviet conduct prior to and immediately after the
proclamation of the naval quarantine strongly implies that
the weapons build-un would not have been stopped pending
application of some alternative not involving the use or
threat of force*
The United States might have sought to bring its case
26Supra, p* 3, n. 12, and p* 4, n* 14,
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before the Security Council or the General Assembly of the
United Nations in preference to the measures which were
taken. The long years of frustration since World War II in
attempting to deal with the Soviet Union in the U. N. would
understandably have led many Americans in October, 1962, to
view such alternatives as unpromising and hardly even worthy
of serious consideration in a situation where quick results
were obviously necessary if they were to be of any real use-*
fulness. Nevertheless, as a part of the totality of the
international law which governs all Member States, the U. N.
Charter contains important obligations on members with
respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes and offers at
least the possibility of solution of these disputes through
the Security Council and General Assembly.
First, there is the requirement that U. N. members
refer disputes which have not been settled by peaceful means
27to the Security Council. This requirement does not, how-
ever, preclude a state from taking other legal measures,
including the use or threat of force in legitimate self-
defense. Nor does the renunciation of the threat or use of
force against another state preclude the resort to legiti-
mate measures of self-defense since only force "against the






is forbidden. The United States did, in feet, refer the
Cuban situation to the Security Council by calling for an
29
urgent meeting to deal with the Cuban situation* There-
fore, the requirement for referring disputes to the Council
was satisfied*
But the important question is whether the united
States should have relied on the Security Council to provide
the settlement or to show the way to a settlement. Viewed
from any reasonably objective perspective afforded by the
voting formula of the Council, it is clear that there could
have been no reasonable grounds for expecting an adequate
settlement* The "veto" power would have permitted the
Soviet Union legally to defeat any proposed solution of
which it disapproved, and the past history of the Soviet
willingness to use the "veto" would have led to only one
conclusion—that any meaningful proposal for settling the
question which would have satisfied the security needs of
the American states was of such a low degree of expectation
as to be practically a waste of time* The United States
could not have been expected to risk a further deterioration
In its security by resorting to a time-consuming procedure
28Article 2(4)*
29State Department Press Release 636, Department of





which offered only the most remote prospect for acceptable
solution of a grave, urgent problem.
Moreover, application to the Security Council for a
settlement of the Cuban situation would have ignored the
fundamental assumption which led to the inclusion of the
"veto" power in the Charter—-that collective security under
the United Nations system would not be made applicable
against a Great Power. The fact that the Soviet Union
would have almost surely vetoed any meaningful solution to
the Cuban situation—and has in the past blocked important
Security Council action by the same device—is not an indi-
cation of a failure of the Security Council as an agency for
enforcing collective security, but is rather a reaffirmation
of the decision made in drafting the U. N. Charter that no
such effort would be made against the conduct of a Great
Power. The voting formula of the Security Council pre-
supposes that the permanent members must be in agreement if
the goal of collective security through Council action is to
be accomplished in an effective manner; it implicitly recog-
nises the inability of the United Nations to take collective
For a clear analysis of the significance of the
"veto" power with respect to aggressive action by a Great
Power, see Inis L. Claude, Jr., "The United Nations and the
Use of Force," International Conciliation , 532 (March, 1961),
325 and 328. Cf . Le'land M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro,
Charter of the United Nations ? Commentary and Documents





action against a major power. There is, of course, the
other side of the same coin—that the United States, as much
as the Soviet Union, could not against its will have been
the object of Security Council action* It would be absurd
seriously to contend that the Security Council would have
been a proper avenue to seek either collective security
action against the Soviet Union or a legal validation of
American action in the Cuban crisis. The Council simply was
not endowed by the Charter with the authority to make such
an undertaking*
The "Uniting for Peace Resolution" passed by the U. N,
31General Assembly on November 3, 1950, was designed to fill
the void created by the requirement for unanimity of perma-
nent Security Council members and was a reflection of a "new
32
enthusiasm for the idea of collective security" following
the experience of apparently successful U* N. resistance to
aggression sponsored by a Great Power in the Korean War*
"Uniting for Peace" was adopted to provide a way of getting
around the difficulty inherent in inaction by the Security
Council on vital questions by calling upon the General
Assembly to consider such questions and to make recommenda-
tions to u* N. members for collective measures, including
31General Assembly Resolution 377<V), text in The
American Journal of International Law Supplement , 45 TT9»51 )
,
l •






the us* of force, to enforce the peace. Therefore, the
United States sdght have taken its complaint against Cuba
and the Soviet Union to the General Assembly under the pro-
visions of "Uniting for Peace," a right which was granted by
33
the Charter Independently of that resolution.
There are, however, serious difficulties in the
"Uniting for Peace" approach to U. N. action. In the first
place, it must be kept uppermost in mind that any General
34Assembly "action" is in fact only recommendatory* "Unit**
ing for Peace" is thus, by its voluntarism, merely a "fac-
35
simile of an » ideal* collective security arrangement" and
represents a
scheme, generally resembling a collective security
arrangement, that might be utilised even in those
situations which the framers of the Charter had
thought it prudent to exclude from the impact of
official United Nations action. 36
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the General Assem-
bly has "no legal power of binding Members by resolutions as
to which State is an aggressor, nor indeed, as to what
37
should be done by any Member in a crisis," Therefore,
even if the Assembly had been disposed to adopt a resolution
33Article 35(1). 34Article 11(2).
35Claude, 0£. cit
. , p. 359.
36Ibld .
37Julius Stone, Aggression and World Order (Berkeley!






calling for a solution to the Cuban situation which would
have been adequate for the security of the Western hemis-
phere, it would have been purely a recommendation and would
have placed no obligation on the Soviet Union and Cuba to
conform and no requirement on any other state to undertake
any recommended action. The Soviet Union could have flouted
any Assembly resolution with complete legal impunity, as it
did in the case of the Hungarian uprising of 1956. Further-
more, and most important to the purposes of this analysl
no General Assembly resolution can give legality to any par-
ticular course of action taken by a state or the Assembly
itself. Whatever recommendations the Assembly may have made
would have been political and not legal* The action recom-
mended would not necessarily even have bmwR legal under
international law and most assuredly would not have had any
effect on the legality of action taken by a state either in
conformity with, or contrary to, the Assembly's recommenda-
tions*
A second serious shortcoming in the General Assembly
approach to settlement of international conflict is the un-
certainty that the Assembly will even act in any effective
manner. This uncertainty is more pronounced in the case of
Great Power disputes or conflicts* It is, of course, also
quite true of the Security Council as well* The bright
dawn, beginning in the adoption of "Uniting for Peace," of a
•
52
new era In collective security which would be applicable in
cases of crisis involving Great Powers proved to be ephem-
38
eral* The "Uniting for Peace" resolution represented a
"fleeting urge to normalise the abnormality of the Korea
39
experience," but statesmen soon returned to the earlier
view that the United Nations should not take action against
a Great Power* The same uncertainty of U* N* action is ap-
plicable, though to a lesser extent, to cases of disputes or
conflicts among smaller powers* A prime example was the
Indian invasion of Goa in 1961* Whatever may have been th>
moral justice in the Indian action, the fact remains thai it
constituted as clear a violation of the obligation of U* H*
members to refrain from the use of force in international
40
relations as can be imagined* But, the Security Council
did nothing of substance to counteract the Indian use of
41force* The priority in international organization in this
century has h^mi given to the prevention of resort to force
38For a discussion of the transformation of the U* N<







"Security Council Fails to Act on Use of Force in
<3oa," UN Review , 9 (January, 1962), 14 j United Nations,
YearbooK" of the United Nations , 1961 (New York J United
Nations QTlLce~Q$ Public fniorma*Eton, 1963), pp. 129-132*
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in preference to the justice of the cause espoused t but the
ins truroentali ties established to oversee this commitment
have not always been faithful in ensuring its execution*
One final observation on the possibility of General
Assembly action in the Cuban crisis has to do with the
Assembly's claim to represent a so-called "conscience of
mankind." Julius Stone has warned of the danger of the
Assembly's power becoming a protective shield foe "predatory
and imperialist designs" against the West if, based on this
claim and the Assembly's promotion of voluntary action by
members "through a regular stacking of votes regardless of
the merits, it committed a detournemont of the moral au~
42thority of that body." There may not appear to be great
cause for immediate alarm at the possibility of the Assem-
bly's doing this, but the danger certainly exists and should
not be encouraged* An unnecessary willingness to accept
General Assembly action as anything more than recommendation
which a member may freely and legally ignore, if it so
chooses, would only tend to encourage the opportunity for
such a diversion of its authority* Only in the most inexact
and superficial sense can the Assembly be said even gener-
ally to represent a "conscience of mankind," and in specific










political victories over opponents by roll-cell vote rather
than to achieve concrete results on matters of genuine sub-
stance.
The foregoing is not meant to indict the United
Nations for its being unable to offer a reasonable alterna-
tive for solution of the Cuban missile crisis, indeed, it
did serve as a highly valuable intermediary in the eventual
resolution of the crisis. What is meant is to show that
certain constitutional features of the law of the Charter,
in the present context of Cold War, preclude the u. If* from
being capable of resolving disputes involving Great lowers-
a defect which was implicit in the writing of the Charter.
It would be highly desirable for any state to be able to
turn to an international authority for protection of its




INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
Although the case made by the United States Govern-
ment In support oi the Cuban quarantine was not based on its
legality as an act of necessary self-defense, it has been
shown that the United States and the other American repub-
lics were clearly motivated by considerations of defense,
whatever may have been their officially stated justification
for the action. It remains, therefore, to analyze the law
of self-defense and to evaluate the quarantine in terms of
this law. For this purpose, it is convenient to divide the
analysis into a study of traditional international law in
effect prior to the establishment of the United Nations and
the law since the adoption of the Charter.
Traditional Law
The right of a nation to resort to forcible measures
in self-defense has always been considered a limited right,
although in practice appeal has often been made to the right
in situations which have clearly exceeded its legitimate
exercise. What was to become a classic statement of the
right, and the law governing it, is found in the correspond-
1
ence concerning the Caroline case which arose in 1837. The
Descriptions of the Caroline incident in William
'-
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Caroline was an American steamer being used to transport
supplies and men for rebels engaged in a Canadian insurrec-
tion. Since the United States had been either unwilling or
unable to put a stop to its activities, the Caroline was
boarded in an American port by a group of British troops who
set the vessel on fire and let it drift over Niagara Falls.
Two men were killed. The United States protested, and the
British Government replied that it had acted in necessary
self-defense. The controversy dragged out until 1842, with
the United States admitting that certain circumstances could
justify such action and with Great Britain admitting that
extreme urgency must be shown to justify it. Although the
two governments differed as to whether circumstances in that
case came within the principle of self-defense, Great Brit-
ain eventually apologized for the invasion of American ter-
ritory and the incident was peacefully concluded. In a note
of August 6, 1842, the American Secretary of State, Daniel
Webster, said in part:
Undoubtedly it is just, that, while it is admitted
that exceptions growing out of the great law of
self-defense do exist, those exceptions should be
confined to cases in which the [quoting an earlier
communication I "necessity of that self-defense is
W. Bishop, Jr. (ed.), International Law : Cases and Materials
(second edition; Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1962),
p. 777 j and J. L. Brier ly, The Law of Nations (sixth edition;






instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation. "2
Given the circumstances justifying the use of force in self-
defense, this force should involve nothing unreasonable or
excessive) since the act, justified by the necessity of
self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept
clearly within it." Webster's words succinctly set forth
the limitations of necessity and proportionality which tra-
ditional International law has imposed on the recourse to
coercive action in self-defense. It is important to note
that, although the standard set by Webster was quite re-
strictive, it did not require actual prior armed attack to
justify the resort to force for self protection. Moreover,
there is room for significant evolution, under the impact of
technological advances in weaponry and of changing concepts
in world politics, in the criteria which determine the exist-
ence of an "instant, overwhelming" necessity leaving "no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.
"
The traditional concept of the right of self-defense
seems to have been that of an inherent and overriding
2Webster to Lord Ashburton. Cited by John Bassett
Moore, A Digest of International Law , Vol. II ( Washington
»
Government Printing Office, 1906), p. 412.
3Webster to Mr. Fox, April 24, 1841. British and
Foreign State Papers , 30:193, cited by R. Y. Jennings,' "The
Caroline and McLaod Cases , " The American Journal of Inter-






right which is applicable to states no less than to indivi-
duals. Oppanheim terms the right of self-defense a
c
"natural right both of individuals and of States" and the
United Nations Charter (Article 51) refers to it as an "in-
herent right."
A convincing case has been made for the proposition
that the concept of self-defense was originally one with
political rather than legal characteristics and that it be-
came legally meaningful only with the attempts to restrict
7
or eliminate the right of resort to war. cording to this
proposition, self-defense is a right established by postive
law and is a right which depends on the illegality of war.
4Herbert W. Briggs (ed.), The Law of Nations (second
edition; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952),
pp. 984-985.
5Brier ly, op_. c i
t
. , pp. 403-4. Brierly points out,
however, that self-defense is a legal right, not an instinct
as is self-preservation, and that whether or not it is justi-
fied is a legal question.
6International Law , ed. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht
(seventh edition; London: David McKay Company, Inc., 1952),
Vol. II, p. 154.
7Josef L. Kunz, "Individual and Collective Self-
Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,"
The American Journal of International Law , 41 (1947), 872.
Professor KunlP assi/rtTons that the right of self-defense
"does not exist ^ ainst any form of aggression which does
not constitute * armed attack'" and that the "threat of ag-
gression" does not justify self-defense are less convincing,




It certainly seems reasonable to conclude that legal justi-
fication need not have been required in support of defensive
measures involving the use or threat of force when the ulti-
mate in force, war itself, was not considered illegal.
Nevertheless, in pre-World War I years, at a time when war
was not considered illegal, nations frequently invoked the
justification of necessary self-defense in support of their
military operations* If the wars they conducted were in
themselves legal or extra-legal, the plea of self-defense
must actually have been raised as a political justification*
The Twentieth Century has witnessed an emphasis in
emerging concepts of international law away from the dis-
tinction of justifiable war to that of legal war; peace and
8
security have been sought in preference to justice* The
Covenant of the League of Nations distinguished between
legal and illegal wars and forbade the latter* The Treaty
for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National
Policy (Kellogg-Briand Pact), signed in Paris on August 27,
1928, renounced war for the solution of international con-
troversies and as an instrument of national policy and
8Josef L. Kunz, "Bellurn Justum and Bellum Legale,"
The American Journal of International Law , 45 (1951), 528*
9Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1928, Vol. i Washington:




provided for the settlement of all disputes or conflicts of
whatever nature or origin only by "pacific means." The sig-
natories to the Treaty were generally agreed that, in spite
of the Pact's sweeping prohibition on war, the rights of
10legitimate self-defense were not precluded and seemingly
that each state was delegated the right of determining the
necessity for resort to force in self-defense. Statements
by the American Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, are
indicative of this attitude. In a note to the other princi-
pal Foreign Offices on June 23, 1929, he stated that the
United States Government
believes that the right of self-defense is inherent
in every sovereign state and implicit in every treaty.
No specific reference to that inalienable attribute
of sovereignty is therefore necessary or desirable. 11
In an earlier note written during the drafting of the Pact
to the Ambassador to France, Mr. Herrick, the Secretary of
State declared:
There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war
treaty which restricts or impairs in any way the
right of self-defense. . • . Every nation is free at
all times and regardless of treaty provisions to
defend its territory from attack or invasion and it
alone is competent to decide whether circumstances
require recourse to war in self-defense. !2
Julius Stone, Aggression and World Order (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1958), p. 32.
Department of State, o£. cit






But Mr* Kellogg seemed to expect that a nation's decision to
Invoke the right of self-defense would be subject to subse-
quent review and adjudication when he added, "If it has a
good case, the world will applaud and not condemn its ac-
tion." 13
Naturally, a concept which allows a state to decide
in the first instance whether or not resort to force is jus-
tified on grounds of "necessary self-defense" is subject to
abuse, and has, in fact, often been abused. It was on these
grounds that Germany attempted to justify its invasion of
14Belgium in 1914 and of Norway in 1940, for example. The
Nuremberg Tribunal dealt with such abuse when it said the
following with respect to the invasion of Norway:
It was further argued that Germany alone could
decide, in accordance with the reservations made by
many of the Signatory Powers at the time of the con-
clusion of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, whether preven-
tive action was a necessity, and that in making her
decision her judgment was conclusive. But whether
action taken under the claim of self-defense was in
fact aggressive or defensive must ultimately be sub-
ject to investigation and adjudication if interna-
tional law is ever to be enforced .15
The language of the Tribunal's decision clearly con-
templates the necessity for a determination, subsequent to
13Ibid.
14Briggs, o£. clt . , p. 985.
15International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judg-
ment and Sentences, October 1, 1946 , The American Journal
oTTnlernaUonal Law. 4l (l9T7)TT72 and* "SET.
••
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the end of hostilities, as to the validity of claims raised
justifying resort to force on the basis of "necessary self-
defense." It seems just as clearly to imply that the
initial judgment as to the necessity is the prerogative of
the state threatened. But this does not help very much; it
does seem obvious that the task of ensuring the subsequent
adjudication of claims of self-defense remains almost as
difficult as it ever was. Without questioning the decisions
of the Tribunal or the propriety of such trials generally,
one still must conclude that the example of Nuremberg only
illustrates a fact which was never in doubt in the first
place—that a state or coalition of states, victorious in
war, can impose adjudication on the defeated state or states.
In the present context of international politics and the
voluntaristic nature of the world legal system, it is doubt-
ful that adjudication of claims of self-defense could be
undertaken except in the aftermath of another world war or
in the unlikely event of agreement among the states involved.
Political review of such claims by the United Nations is
only slightly more likely and must be considered probable
only in situations not involving any of the Great Powers or
a lesser power having the support of a Great Power.
Furthermore, the concept of permitting each state to
make the initial determination, subject to possible subse-




in self-defense is still open to the same dangers of abuse
in the evaluation of what constitutes "instant, overwhelming"
necessity and the limits of force which involves "nothing
unreasonable or excessive." The dangers inherent in this
concept of self-defense are great, but they cannot be wished
away* The only way the situation can be completely allevi-
ated is to bring about a significant change in the distribu-
tion of the power to enforce law. "The national state might
remain, but it could no longer be the principal—let alone
16
the sole—custodian of the instruments of violence."
Since such a transformation is at present—and for the fore-
seeable future—unlikely to be accomplished, we will have to
make the best of the institutions and legal tools available
to us.
The Nuremberg Tribunal added further support to the
doctrine of self-defense as prescribed by Denial Webster
when it stated:
It must be remembered that preventive action in for-
eign territory is justified only in case of "an
instant and overwhelming necessity for self-defense
leaving no choice of means, and no moment of delib-
eration."17
It therefore seems accurate to describe the
16Robert W. Tucker, The Just War (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press, I960), p. 133.






traditional law of self-defense effective prior to the adop-
tion of the United Nations Charter as embodying the elements
of necessity for response, proportionality of that response
undertaken by the target state, permissibility of unilateral
decision as to the necessity for response and its propor-
tionality, and subsequent review and adjudication of this
initial decision. As has been observed, this last element
is, at best, uncertain of fulfillment, but its importance in
the MB9B»m6nt of the legality of resort to force in self-
defense, specifically in this analysis of the Cuban quaran-
tine, is not thereby diminished.
As was noted above, the test first formulated by
Daniel Webster to ascertain the justification of a claim of
necessary self-defense did not require that actual armed
attack precede response by force on the part of the target
state. However, the criteria are quite strict and narrow,
if taken literally. In fact, if applied in a dogmatically
literal manner today in a serious political and military
confrontation of the nature of the Cuban missile crisis
carrying with it the urgency of the possibility of instan-
taneous nuclear holocaust, the effect would be virtually to
impose paralysis in reacting to a serious threat. In an era
with the possibility of "nuclear blackmail" a state could
lose a war and its political independence without a shot
being fired if it were content to abide by the letter of a






strict interpretation in Nineteenth Century terms of that
degree of necessity prescribed by Webster. But it is not
necessary to insist on such a literal interpretation* inter-
national law nev^r required that a victim of attack await
the first blow before responding for the very reason that
such a requirement might have caused disaster or irreparable
damage. If such was the reason over a century ago, it must
still be the only valid reason for the right of self-defense,
That right must be capable of sustaining its ralson d»ltre
today, no less than yesterday. Therefore, it must follow
that the right of self-defense must be interpreted today in
such a manner that its objective can be achieved. A broad
formulation of this right, as established by traditional
practice, has been described as authorizing
a state which, being the target of activities by
another state, reasonably decides, as third-party
observers may determine reasonableness, that such
activities imminently require it to employ the
military instrument to protect its territorial in-
tegrity and political independence, to use such
force as may be necessary and proportionate for
securing its defense. 18
This formulation does no violence to the thought and inten-
tion of Webster; it merely expresses them in language more
appropriate to the contemporary political and military
18
Myres S. McOougal, "The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and








situation* Professor McDougal has undertaken a systematic
19
appraisal of features of the context of the particular
events to which the United States reacted in the Cuban
crisis as a means of determining the conditions of necessity
facing the United States. These features were considered
under the following category headings: participants, objec-
tives, situation, base values, strategies, and outcomes.
His conclusion was that a third-party observer "could rea-
sonably conclude that the action taken by the United States
was in accord with traditional general community expecta-
20tions about the requirements of self-defense*"
Clearly the danger inherent in the build-up of offen-
21
sive weapons in Cuba was great and the urgency real*
While the completion of the installation of the weapons sys-
tems in Cuba would not necessarily have made attack imminent,
it would have caused, at the very least, irreparable damage,
if not disaster, to the status of American security* In-
stallation of the offensive weapons on Cuban territory would
have radically altered the international power structure to
the detriment of the United States and the rest of the free
world. The Soviet Union would have achieved a greater vic-
tory, without actual war, than many aggressors in the past
19Ibid.
, pp. 601-3.





have sought through overt aggression. The threat of early
accomplishment of such a profound shift in world power rela-
tionships, of such a major victory without firing a shot,
would seem to have certainly justified the resort to forc-
ible measures by the American republics in legitimate self-
defense* To deny the right in a case of such obvious danger,
in the present context, would deprive the historic right of
much of its value*
The second test of traditional international law to
be applied to the Cuban quarantine is that of proportionality.
Essentially, the test of proportionality requires that an
offended state use only such means as are necessary to in-
duce the offending state to forego its offending conduct and
which are proportional to the offense committed* In its
negative formulation, the requirement specifies "that acts
taken in self-defense may not be disproportionate to the
danger threatened, and that they will prove disproportionate
if they exceed in manner or in purpose the necessity pro-
22
voicing them*" This requirement is subject to abuse by
states Invoking the claim of self-defense as serious as the
23
abuse to the right itself, but this fact need not be of
concern here unless it can be shown that the quarantine of
Cuba was a disproportionate action*
Tucker, oj>. cit





The objective of the quarantine was simply to defeat
the Soviet Union's efforts to overthrow the existing power
structure in the Western hemisphere and to install a power-
ful military threat within that structure. It sought no
change in the status quo and posed no threat to any nation.
24
The naval quarantine Itself was a selected interdiction of
specified types of offensive weapons and was carried out in
a limited area of the high seas adjacent to but outside
Cuba's territorial waters. While it is obvious that the
success of the quarantine was dependent on the willingness
and ability to use force in support of it, if that had been
necessary, careful steps were taken to ensure that such
force would have been as a last resort and strictly limited.
The proclamation instituting the quarantine provided that
force shall not be used except in case of failure or
refusal to comply with directions, or with regulations
or directives of the Secretary of Defense issued here-
under, after reasonable efforts have been made to
communicate them to the vessel or craft, or in case of
self-defense. In any case, force shall be used only
to the extent necessary. 25
Secretary of State Dean Rusk described the propor-
tionality of the quarantine by stating that the United
24Text of the Presidential Proclamation entitled,
"Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba,"
in Department of State Bulletin , XLVII (1962), 717; and The
American Journal of International Law
,
57 (1963), 512. See
also Appendix B, Infra
, pp. 114-117.
25Supra






States must tailor its response, "individually and collec-
tively, to the degree and direction of the threat . • • "
and would accomplish its "purposes with the appropriate and
necessary use of force and with necessary opportunity to
26
remove this grave threat by means other than general war."
^ In short, the objective of the quarantine was the
limited one of requiring the removal of the offensive threat
from Cuba and the means used to accomplish this were
strictly limited to that degree of force, or available force,
necessary to bring about the removal* Therefore, the quar-
antine must be regarded as having been proportionate to the
situation.
The inadequacy under existing law of procedures for
the subsequent review and adjudication of claims of self-
defense is well known. There was no judicial review of the
legality of the quarantine, although there was, in a limited
Benme t political review of its propriety by the organs of
the United Nations. It should be kept in mind that the
United States did not base its case for the quarantine on a
claim of necessary self-defense, so the only review which
its position would have anticipated was that concerning the
question of Security Council authorisation for regional
26Statement before special meeting of the Council of
the O.A.S. on October 23, 1962, Department of State Bulletin ,






peace-keeping functions taken under Article 53 of the
27Charter* Therefore, only the most superficial investiga-
tion and review of the quarantine action was actually under-
taken and this was of a political nature rather than a
judicial inquiry.
International law of self-defense has always recog-
nised the right of a target state to make the initial judg-
ment, subject to subsequent review, as to the necessity for
resort to forcible measures in self-defense. Therefore, the
united States and the other American republics were justi-
fied in taking the initiative in the face of a grave, imme-
diate threat to their security. It is an important aspect
of the quarantine that it was a carefully-measured, easily
reversible step which in no way prejudiced the possibility
of subsequent judicial or political investigation. The
course of action taken by the Security Council in not adopt-
28ing a Soviet Union resolution condemning the quarantine
and instead in choosing to facilitate a negotiated settle-
ment of the crisis constituted, in a political sexism, tacit




28United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations
,
1962 (New York: Columbia University Press, 19(U), pp. 104-
irrr
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The Law of the United Nations
Whatever may have been the rules of traditional inter-
national law concerning the right of self-defense prior to
the era of the United Nations, it is today necessary to
evaluate these rules in the light of Charter provisions.
The only reference to self-defense in the Charter is con-
29
tained in Article 51 which reserves the "inherent" right
of individual and collective self-defense in case of armed
attack on a member as an interim measure until the Security
Council has acted to maintain peace and security. Paragraphs
30
3 and 4 of Article 2 are also relevant* The former obli-
gates members to settle disputes by peaceful means and the
29
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if
an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security. Measures
taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-
defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Coun-
cil and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems neces-
sary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security." The American Journal of International Law Supple-
ment , 39 (19ZST, 1M and "EST.
30
"3. All Members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that inter-
national peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
"4. All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the terri-
torial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the




latter requires them to refrain from the threat or use of
force against the territorial Integrity or political Inde-
pendence of any state or in any other manner Inconsistent
with U. N. purposes and principles*
ome writers have concluded that the language of
Article 51 limits the right of self-defense, Individual or
collective, to cases Involving resistance to "armed at-
31tack." From this interpretation of the Charter, it was
possible to conclude that "the United States resorted to a
• • • forcible action [in the Cuban quarantine] which can-
not be reconciled with its obligations under the United
32Nations Charter. ..."
It is submitted, however, that such an interpretation
33
of the U. N. Charter is not necessary. Clearly, Article
31Oppenheim, op. cit
. ,
p. 156j Briggs, o£. cit . , p.
986 | Kunz, "Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Arti-
cle 51 of the Charter of the United Nations," op . cit . , p.
8 78 j Quincy Wright, "The Cuban Quarantine," The American
Journal of International Law t 57 (1963), 546 and 560 j Philip
Jessup, A""Modern Law oT"Natlons (New York* MacMillan and
Company ,""1948 ) , p . 16lTj" Hans Kelson, Principles of Inter-
national Law (New Yorki Rlnehart and Company, l91>2), p. 61.
32Opinion expressed by Quincy Wright as reported in
"Law and Conflicts Changing Patterns and Contemporary Chal-
lenges," Proceedings of the American Society of International
Law , 57 (1^3), 1 andT-ToT
33Myres 3. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, Law
and Minimum World Public Order (New Havens Yale University
Press, 1961), pp. 232-241; J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations




51 does reserve to states the right to resort to force or
threat of force in self-defense in case of "armed attack .
"
In fact, it refers to this right as an "inherent right,"
But that is not the same thing as forbidding the exercise of
a similar right under different circumstances. To reaffirm
one specific customary right does not necessarily restrict
another customary right* Indeed, it would seem that the
customary right of a state to resort to force in self-
defense in situations of necessity which is "instant, over-
whelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation" remains unimpaired unless it has been specif-
ically modified by the Charter. The very term "inherent
right" suggests that the right of self-defense is a funda-
mental one and is not restricted or qualified unless the
U. N. Charter has done so* Article 51 certainly does not
modify the right.
Proponents of the restrictive interpretation of
Article 51 of the Charter are substituting for the words "if
an armed attack occurs" the meaning "if, and only if, an
armed attack occurs." This meaning is not warranted, and
the fallacy in it has been described in the following way:
"A proposition that 'if A, then B» is not equivalent to, and
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does not necessarily imply, the proposition that » if , and
only if, A, then B.»" 34
Article 51 of the Charter was introduced into the
Charter at San Francisco largely due to the insistence of
the Latin American republics as a means for making regional
defensive organizations compatible with the peace enforce-
35
xnent powers and responsibilities of the United Nations.
There seems to be no evidence that there was any expectation
that this new provision would in any way alter the tradi-
36tional right of self-defense. It seems to have been a
case of including Article 51, with its somewhat ambiguous
language, as a way of accommodating regional security agree-
ments within the United Nations system and of having no
intention, and giving little thought, to restricting the
traditional right of self-defense. There is, however, else-
where in the travaux preparatoires some evidence that the
conferees at San Francisco had no intention of altering the
34McDougal and Feliciano, op_. cit
. , p. 237, n. 261.
[italics in original.]
35Department of State, Report to the President on the
Results of the San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of
the United" States Delegation
, the Secretary of State
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 194T)
, pp. 101-8.
Work of Committee 4 of Commission III, United
Nations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on Inter-
national Organisation , Vol. XII (New York" United Nations





traditional right of self-defense. In a report which was
approved by the Conference, the following statement was made
concerning this right, • • « the unilateral use of force or
similar coercive measures is not authorized. The use of
arms in legitimate self-defense remains admitted and unim-
paired." 37
Any evaluation of the legal right of self-defense
and, more specifically, the legality of the Cuban quarantine
must take into consideration the obligation of United
Nations members to refrain from the threat or use of force.
38This obligation is contained in Article 2(4) of the Charter
and the prohibition of the threat or use of force applies as
"against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.' 1 It should be noted that
this renunciation of the use of force in international rela-
tions is far from complete.
Thus, any resort to the use or threat of force
directed against a state's territory or political independ-
ence or otherwise inconsistent with U. N. purposes is
illegal under the law of the Charter, claims of necessary
self-defense notwithstanding. It is, of course, difficult
to imagine a resort to force in legitimate self-defense
37Ibid. , Vol. VI, p. 459. 38Supra
.
p. 71 , n. 30.
...
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and not exceeding the limits of proportionality which could
be violative of Article 2(4). The great value of Article
2(4) in respect to the right of self-defense is that it is
one guideline which can he used in evaluating the necessity
for and proportionality of measures taken on the claim of
self-defense. It certainly does not in itself forbid resort
to the threat or use of force in legitimate self-defense.
However, the criticism has been made by Professor
39Quincy Wright that the Cuban quarantine violated Article
2(4) in that it was a threat of force directed against the
Soviet Union's vessels on the high seas and as such consti-
tuted a threat of military force to induce the Soviet union
to change its policy or to abandon its rights. This he
equates to a violation of that state's "political independ-
40
ence." In arriving at this conclusion, he refers to the
quarantine as depriving the Soviet Union of "its right to
freedom of the seas • and its "right to navigate the high
41
seas," and equates Soviet activities in Cuba to "trade
42
• • • in time of peace." This choice of terms, bordering
on the naive, fails to take note of the true nature of this
39
"The Cuban Quarantine," 0£. cit., p. 546.
4 Ibld ., pp. 556-557.
41Opinion reported in "Law and Conflict: Changing
Patterns and Contemporary Challenges , " Proceedings of the
American Society of International Law , 57 (1^63), 1, 9-10.
42





"trade" and applies an interpretation of "political inde-
pendence" broader than the plain and natural meaning of the
Charter requires.
In spite of Professor Wright's belief that a "common-
43
sense interpretation" would characterize threat of mili-
tary force against a state's vessels at sea as violating
that state's political independence , it seems more reason-
able to define such a violation in terms of political sub-
jugation or domination, not necessarily by political or
military means* To Induce a government to change a policy,
even if by a threat of force, is quite different from sub-
jection of that state to outside political domination* In
this sense, the quarantine was clearly not a threat to the
political independence of either Cuba or the Soviet Union,
since it had as its sole purpose requiring the removal of
offensive weapons from Cuba and the prevention of importa-
tion of additional weapons.
Furthermore, in establishing the quarantine* the
United States was hardly interfering with the Soviet Union's
right to freedom of the seas in conducting trade in time of
peace* It was not trade which the United States sought to
keep out of Cuba, but offensive weapons the nature and





peace and security in violation of Article 1(1) of the U. N.
Charter. It would be ironic, indeed, if a nation were ex-
pected to sit idly by and see its security threatened and
the peace of the world endangered by another state which had
fewer scruples about violating United Nations obligations.
Such would have been the case in the Cuban missile crisis if
excessively broad interpretations of "trade" and "political
independence" were valid.
Finally, under Article 2(4) there is the prohibition
of the threat or use of force in any other manner inconsis-
tent with the purposes of the United Nations. These pur-
poses are set forth in Article 1 of the Charter and include
the maintenance of international peace and security, the
development of friendly relations among nations, the achieve-
ment of international cooperation, and serving as a center
for harmonizing the actions of nations. It is hard to see
how the quarantine, in the circumstances of the Cuban situa-
tion and with the alternatives available, could be consid-
ered to have been inconsistent with these purposes. It is
certainly true that the quarantine contemplated the use of
force had that been necessary and that such use of force
would have endangered international peace, but it is only
slightly less obvious that the successful completion of in-
stallation of the offensive weapons systems in Cuba by the




international peace and the security, particularly, of the
American republics. The conspiracy of the Soviet Union and
Cuba to install the weapons in the Western hemisphere was
itself a clear threat to international peace and security,
hence a violation of Article 2(4) as inconsistent with U. N.
purposes; the quarantine was such a threat only to the ex-
tent that peace and security would have been endangered had
the Soviet Union refused to desist from its provocative and
illegal action. It might be instructive to speculate as to
how well the purposes of the United Nations would have been
served by a failure on the part of the United States and the
other American republics to react to the threat or to have
reacted in some fashion offering less prospect for success.
Article 2(3) of the Charter obligates each member of
the United Nations to settle disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner so as not to endanger peace, security, and
justice. The establishment of a quarantine was hardly a
"peaceful means" since it depended on the availability and
use of military force, if needed, in order for it to have
succeeded in its objective. It need not otherwise be shown
that the American course of action was consistent with
Article 2(3) if the claim of necessary self-defense is valid.
As has been pointed out, military necessity created a situa-






44procedures of negotiation and appeal to the United Nations,
procedures which offered little prospect for success any-
45
way.
The decision of the International Court of Justice in
46the Corfu Channel case has considerable relevance to the
subject of the law of self-defense since it was delivered
subsequent to the coming into force of the United Nations
Charter. In upholding the right of innocent passage for
warships in time of peace, even when such passage was car-
ried out as a means of asserting this right by warships
which were at battle stations and fully prepared to retali-




1. The existence of a general principle that a state
may uphold a right which is being unjustly denied, and
2. The legitimacy of preparations for the immediate
resort to forcible measures of self-defense in the event of
48
attack while upholding a legal right.
44 45Supra
, pp. 35-40. Supra , pp. 40-53.
4b
"The Corfu Channel Case (Merits)," International
Court of Justice , Reports of Judqm nts , Advisory Opinions
and Prefers , lf4*9* ( Leyden , Holland! : International Court of
Justice, 1949), pp. 4-172} Decision and digest of dissenting
opinions in The American Journal of International Law , 43
(1949), 558.
47Brierly, o£. clt ., pp. 424-425.




With respect to the latter assumption, the Court did
not specifically state that the actual resort to force would
be legitimate in case of attack, but since the British war-
ships involved were under orders to fire back if attacked,
it certainly must have felt so, or it could not have found
49the passage of the warships to have been innocent.
If these foregoing conclusions are valid inferences
from the Court' 3 decision, they are of considerable rele-
vance to the broad subject of self-defense and to the
specific question of the legality of the Cuban quarantine.
In the broad view, a philosophy which permits the use of a
threat of force—as clearly was the case with the passage of
battle-ready British warships through Albanian territorial
waters—to uphold a legal right, would surely permit the use
or threat of force in self-defense of the security of a
nation. It would not be inappropriate to point out that
national security is a more fundamental right of a state
than that of innocent passage for its vessels at sea.
ground that the conclusions reached by the Court were too
narrowly drawn and that the requirement of a "certain degree
of consequential!ty in the values sought to be conserved" is
an effect of the principles of necessity and proportionality.
McDougal and Feliciano, op. cit
• , pp. 226-228. The latter
criticism would seem not~~to be applicable to the Cuban mis-
sile crisis for the reason that the values sought to be
conserved were "indispensable components of . . . 'terri-











Tne Corfu Channel case is quite similar to the Cuban
crisis in the important respect that in neither case was
there an effort made to settle the dispute by arbitration or
other peaceful means as provided for under Article 2(3) of
the United Nations Charter. If it can be asserted that the
urgency of the situation in the Cuban confrontation did not
allow the time for such means, the same justification can
hardly be made for Great Britain's actions in the Corfu
Channel. Prior to the incidents of October, 1946, which
subsequently led to adjudication before the International
Court of Justice, neither Great Britain nor Albania ever
suggested that the legal question involved be submitted to
50
arbitration or to any other peaceful means of settlement.
The only reasonable inference to be drawn from this is that
the Court sanctioned the resort to threat or use of force in
upholding a legal right, even without a prior effort to
achieve settlement through peaceful means other than bi-
lateral diplomatic discourse. It is but a short, obvious
step to the conclusion that a state may legally resort to
the use of force in self-defense against another state which
threatens the security of the former without first attempting
to find a solution to the dispute through pacific means,







IMPLICATIONS FOR A MODERN DOCTRINE
OF SELF-DEFENSE
The experience of the Cuban quarantine revealed the
inadequacy, in the present international quasi-order, of
adherence to a restrictive interpretation of the right of
self-defense limited to response to actual armed attack.
Self-defense is a right available to "states no less than to
individuals," but in the context of an international system
which offers only limited expectation that community insti-
tutions will be able and willing to protect its members, it
is only a realistic recognition of the facts of life that
leads to the conclusion that international law must permit
to states an even broader interpretation of what constitutes
necessity for invoking the right. If it were otherwise, the
doctrine would fail to serve "its basic policy function in
2
conservation of human and material values" since the
present development of weaponry and technology would mean
J. L. Brier ly, The Law of Nations (sixth edition;
New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 403-4.
2
W. T. Mallison, Jr., "Limited Naval Blockade or
Quarantine-Interdiction; National and Collective Claims
Valid Under International Law," The George Washington Law
Review , 31 (December, 1962), 335 and 355.
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that waiting for armed attack before resorting to measures
in self-defense would make any defense of doubtful value.
Effect of Modern Technology and Weaponry
The Cuban missile crisis is illustrative of an impor-
tant change in the requirements of an adequate interpretation
of the right of self-defense—an interpretation which makes
it militarily feasible for the purpose of the right of self-
defense to be served. These changes brought about by the
present state of technology and weaponry require a very dif-
ferent interpretation of the criteria for self-defense
formulated by Daniel Webster as "necessity of self-defense,
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no
moment for deliberation" and a response involving "nothing
3
unreasonable or excessive." This is not to question the
continued validity of Webster ' s requirements of necessity
and proportionality, but only to observe that the conditions
which may constitute "necessity" have undergone an important
transformation. At the time of the Caroline incident, a
nation could have afforded to await the first strike in an
armed conflict without exposing itself to irreparable damage
before responding to the threat, but this was not required
even in that era of unsophisticated weaponry. Traditional
international law has always recognized the right of a state
3Supra




to resort to forcible measures in self-defense when the
imminence of attack is of such a high degree as to preclude
effective resort to non-violent means of meeting the
4threat. Since it has been shown in Chapter IV that the
traditional law concept of self-defense is still valid in
essentially its pre-United Nations formulation, it is neces-
sary only to reassert this right interpreted in such a
manner that its purpose will still be militarily feasible.
Modern technology has made it possible for a nation
to unleash a massive attack of hitherto undreamed-of de-
structive power against its victim within such a short
period of time that defense would be impossible or futile
unless undertaken on virtually split-second notice or as an
anticipatory measure. It is recognized that advocacy of an
anticipatory force in self-defense comes very close to advo-
cacy of preventive war. The risk of confusing the two con-
cepts is accepted, however, on the belief that the former
can be distinguished by an urgency which reasonably requires
an intended victim to take forcible measures for its own
security and by the nature of that response, which must be
kept within the limits of the minimum of force which is
necessary for ensuring the continuance of security. It is
not inappropriate, at this point, again to recall the purpose
4Myres S. McDougal, "The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and
Self-Defense, " The American Journal of International Law ,







of self-defense in order that it be kept in mind that what
the right seeks to prevent is potentially much more serious
and quite probably more destructive than the limited force
which should be employed in its prevention.
The speed of modern missiles and manned jet aircraft
is so great and the weapons they are capable of delivering so
powerful that it would constitute an act of gross national
irresponsibility for a government knowingly to wait until
nuclear weapons were enroute to that nation *s territory
before taking military steps in self-defense. Such an
action—or more properly inaction—is an extreme, hypotheti-
cal case and one which is not likely ever to take place, but
it is a valid statement of the result which could come about
from a strict application of the restrictive interpretation
of the right of self-defense which holds that Article 51 of
the U. M. Charter restricts the right to the use of force to
situations involving actual armed attack. Application of
the restrictive interpretation might very well mean imposi-
tion of delay in responding to a threat until defense would
be too late.
An armed attack in the old days still gave time
for defense} an armed attack from a missile base
located within short range would make self-defense
meaningless; there would be nothing left to defend,
if the victim were to await concrete evidence of the
attack. 5
Charles G. Fenwick, "The Quarantine Against Cuba:
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Successful installation of nuclear weapons systems in Cuba
in 1962 would have exposed the United States and the rest of
the hemisphere to Just such a possibility—with a meaningless
right of self-defense and nothing left to defend had an at-
tack been initiated. The United States was not required to
acquiesce in its being placed in such an untenable military
position. There would be little reason to retain the right
of self-defense at all if its use is to be so narrowly re-
stricted as to raaJce it militarily impossible to defend one's
country against the danger most probably to be raised.
Thus, the danger with which the impending completion
of offensive weapons facilities in Cuba confronted the
American republics brings home the fact that the right of
self-defense "must not be interpreted so narrowly as to in-
6duce inaction or defer action until it is too late." The
case in support of the view that the traditional inter-
national law concept of the right of self-defense has been
set forth in Chapter IV. It seems apparent, from the stand-
point of modern technology and weaponry, that this right must
not only be retained, but that also the determination of
what constitutes "necessity 11 of defense must be made in full
recognition of the nature of modern arms. Webster *s concept
Legal or Illegal?," The American Journal of International Law,






of an "instant, overwhelming" necessity is still valid; it
is in the realm of the factors which constitute necessity
that a transformation has occurred.
It is indeed unfortunate that the implication of the
effect of modern technology on the nature of necessity for
self-defense is to broaden the field of objective factors
which can contribute to that necessity, but it is equally as
unfortunate, as it is true, that the consequences of failing
to take note of the broadening of that field would be far
more serious than at any time in the past.
It is not considered feasible to attempt to define
objective factors which would constitute necessity for self-
defense for essentially the same reasons that international
statesmen have failed to agree on a definition of aggres-
7
sion. It is doubtful that any definition could take into
account all possible factors and at the same time prevent
the definition from being open to the abuse of aggressors
to s^rve their own ends* As "the notion of aggression is
8broader than that of aggressive or offensive war," so too
is the notion of self-defense broader than that of response
to aggressive or offensive war. The determination of the
7For a brief, concise discussion of the desirability
of defining aggression, see Charles de Visscher, Theory and
Reality in Public International Law (Princeton* Princeton






validity of claims of "necessary self-defense" will depend
on the specific circumstances of each case*
International Regulation of Force in Disputes
The Cuban missile crisis is further Illustrative of
the yet uncompleted task of the effective regulation of the
use of force within the international system* In the
simplest terms, the crisis was a confrontation of two Great
Powers, each of which was seeking an end which the other
wished strongly to frustrate* Neither the United States nor
the Soviet Union was legally subject, against its will, to
the restraint of any international regulatory agency, al-
though both were subject to the rules of international law*
The conduct of the Soviet Union has been criticised as hav-
ing been in violation of the law of the U. II* Charter? and
the United States has been criticized elsewhere for having
10
acted illegally* Moreover, a U. S* Government official
conceded that "such progr^an as we have made [toward set-
tlement of the crisis to the satisfaction of the U. S.3
cannot, on the whole, be attributed to our legal position* w
The same official seemed to downgrade the importance of the
9 10Supra , pp* 77-79* See supra , p. 5, nn* 19-22*
1 Abram Chayes, Legal Advisor, Department of state,
''The Legal Case for U* 3. Action on Cuba," address before
the Tenth Reunion of the Harvard Law School Class of 1952 in
Boston, Massachusetts, November 3, 1962, Department of State
Bulletin . XLVII (November 19, 1962), 763.
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U. S. Government's legal position when he added: "But if it
would not have been enough merely to have the law on our
side, that is not to say it is wholly irrelevant which side
12the law was on.'*
The preceding facts and opinion are not very encour-
aging to a world which realizes, through the experience of
two world wars and an interminable cold war, the conse-
quences of a failure to attain the effective regulation of
force in international relations. But they are, neverthe-
less, realistic inferences from the contemporary inter-
national system. Men dedicated to the concept of "the rule
of law" in international affairs—as most Americans would
claim to be—will hardly be satisfied with this state of
affairs, but they cannot escape the reality of it. Mfc&t
would welcome the unqualified outlawing of the unilateral
resort to arms in international disputes, but they would do
well to ensure first that the law will be obeyed and that
justice will not be sacrificed to a premature renunciation
of arms which would be adhered to only by just men.
It is apparent to the casual observer that individual
resort to force has not been eliminated from the world scene.
This fact may be attributed to the absence of an effective
13international organization for enforcing world order or,
12 11







more fundamentally, to an unwillingness of nations and
peoples themselves to accept limitations upon their freedom
14
of action. It could be corrected either through an inter-
national authority sufficiently powerful to impose order or
through a transformation in the attitudes of states and *V^"
peoples. The latter would probably be more desirable in the
long run, but it would be a long run. The implication would
be the same in either case. International relations ordered
by law and effectively eliminating individual resort to
force must ultimately be accomplished through a monopoliza-
tion of coercive power, or at least the greater part of it,
in an international institution charged with the authority
and responsibility for enforcing order. It matters very
little for the purposes here whether it is done by inter-
national consensus or is imposed.
What we have in the world today is far from what is
needed to enforce world order. This is all the more reason
why it is vital to ensure that minimum world order will be
enforced before we undertake to exclude all forms of force
in international relations. Nothing is to be gained by
accepting rules of law which only the virtuous will obey.
Specifically, the traditional rule of self-defense must be
retained until it is certain that it is no longer necessary
14Clyde Eagleton, International Government (third




to protect legitimate rights. The Cuban missile crisis was
an instance in which the United States and the other Ameri-
can republics clearly had no practical alternative to the
use of force in self-defense. No other procedure would have
offered a reasonable probability of protecting their secu-
rity in an effective, timely manner. In the context of the
present International system and a realistic assessment of
the nature and intentions of the adversary, only a determi-
nation to maintain their security with military force, if
necessary, promised any real prospect for successfully im-
plementing self-defensive measures. The traditional right
of self-defense was adequate legal justification for the
action undertaken. It is in this type of situation, when
international regulatory institutions are incapable of
satisfying the just and legitimate security requirements of
states, that retention of a realistic doctrine of self-
defense is essential.
The Test of Proportionality
The measures taken by the American republics to
secure the removal of missiles from Cuba were strictly
limited in scope and in application to that which may be
regarded as having been the minimum degree of coercion
necessary to accomplish the ends sought—the end to the





quarantine was in careful and faithful conformity to the
15
requirement of proportionality. In contrast with past
occasions when the force invoked for the purpose of self-
defense has often far exceeded that minimum of coercion
necessary to bring about discontinuation of the offensive
conduct, the force applied in the missile crisis was
strictly limited to what was necessary to ensure the con-
tinued security of the hemisphere. There was no "uncondi-
tional surrender" attitude.
No doubt the strongest force in moderating American
action against Cuba and the Soviet Union was the possibility
that anything more coercive in scope or application would
have greatly increased the possibility of a major nuclear
war with the Soviet Union. The care with which the ufeited
States, and other world powers, have in recent years tem-
pered their actions so as not unnecessarily to provoke a
major military response from the Communist bloc was quite
apparent in all facets of the American undertaking of naval
quarantine. The means employed were strictly limited to the
scope of the necessity which prompted American response,
15For a good evaluation of the proportionality of the
quarantine, see Carl Q. Christol and Charles R. Davis,
"Maritime Quarantine: the Naval Interdiction of Offensive
Weapons and Associated Materiel to Cuba, 1962," The American







largely for the reason that any excess of force would have
Increased the possibility of major Soviet response.
It is also probable that the carefully-measured
response to the weapons build-up was due partly to the
moderating influence of the collective approach to the
situation through the CAS and the weight of world public
opinion. It is recalled that the action was taken on the
formal basis of action by the Organization of American
States and that the United States Government made strong
efforts to justify the action before the United Nations and
world public opinion. The impact of these forces should not
be over-emphasized for it is obvious that they are always
less important in determining policy than are considerations
*
of national security. But their effect cannot be denied
either. The whole of American conduct in the crisis as
manifest in the proportionality of the measures undertaken
showed a clear consciousness of, and commitment to, a col-
lective approach to the problem and a course of action which
would appeal to the entire world as a moderate response for
strictly limited purposes. International organization is
still rudimentary and world public opinion is still uncer-
tain and of a doubtful weight in affecting actions taken on
the basis of national interest, but the experience of the
Cuban quarantine demonstrated that they are factors which
have a growing importance in international affairs. This

95
importance, hopefully, will continue to exercise growing
influence in limiting the action taken in self-defense to
that level which is consistent with the necessity for
response and proportional to the danger threatened*
The right of self-defense is open to the serious
abuse that the response to attack or threatened attack will
be far in excess of what is necessary to repel the immediate
danger, or even to remove that danger* The doctrine formu-
lated by Webster gave no such license and international
legal specialists have, over the years, insisted on the
requirement of proportionality, but the practice of states
has been quite a different matter. An insistence upon
"unconditional surrender" or, at a minimum, "victory" has
been characteristic of the attitude of absolute defense.
Such would still likely be the case in a major war, conven-
tional or otherwise, but the Cuban quarantine revealed—as
the Korean experience had earlier shown—that restraints are
more likely today to be placed on defensive military opera-
tions and that these operations will consequently more
likely be proportional to the threat acted against. These
restraints are the result primarily of the prudent realiza-
tion that excess may well result in escalation of the
16Richard A. Falk, Law , Morality , and War in the Con-









conflict into a major war, but the importance of the moder-
ating influences of international organization—universal
and regional—and of world public opinion is increasing and
should not be overlooked or discouraged.
The Role of Regional Organizations
The Cuban experience was an interesting demonstration
of a regional organization's reacting collectively to a
threat to its common peace and security* Confronted with
the danger implicit in the installation of offensive nuclear
weapons systems in Cuba, the Organization of American States
acted quickly and decisively in response to that danger.
It is tempting to discount the significance of the
OAS action by asserting that the Organization simply rubber-
stamped the action proposed by the United States and that
the quarantine was not really a collective undertaking since
the United States provided the overwhelmingly greater part
of the forces committed to the operation. The first asser-
tion is not plausible because of the strong and long-standing
suspicion among Latin American nations of any action by the
United States which, in any way, seems like "intervention"
in another American republic. The fact that the OAS recom-
mended the use of military force, if necessary, to prevent
the weapons in Cuba from becoming operational could only be
explained by a genuine consensus among the members that






circumstances as they were, Brazil, Mexico, and Bolivia ab-
stained from that part of the OAS resolution which recom-
17
mended the use of armed force, an action obviously
reflecting historic Latin American opposition in principle
to intervention in the affairs of American states.
It is true, of course, that the major portion of the
armed force units used in carrying out the quarantine were
provided by the United States, but this is no indication
that the other American states were giving less than full
support to the quarantine* It was, instead, the practical
result of the facts that the United States had the necessary
forces immediately available for use in the quarantine and
the other nations had only limited forces, most of which
were not immediately available.
The collective action of the Organization of American
States is significant chiefly for two reasons. First, it
demonstrated the ability of regional organizations to act
collectively for their own self-defense and, second, it pro-
vided a valuable alternative to either unilateral resort to
force on a claim of self-defense or appeal to the organs of
the United Nations with limited expectation of assistance.
The OAS action was not taken on a formal claim of
self-defense, but it was obviously motivated by a feeling




that the hemispheric security was threatened and took the
same form as a resort to force in self-defense. The signi-
ficance of the OAS action as a procedure for collective
self-defense should not be over-emphasized, however. In the
Cuban crisis the threat was more obviously urgent and appar-
ent than it is likely to be in other such cases; without
these factors effective OAS action would have been much less
likely. Furthermore, had the threat been limited to only
one or a small number of states, it would have been less
likely that the necessary majority would have conscien-
tiously upheld the principle of collective self-defense by
approving the action taken. Regional organizations are
subject to the same lapses in devotion to collective secu-
rity as is the United Nations. A final reservation concern-
ing the significance of the OAS action is the caution with
which one should use the Cuban experience to draw any conclu-
sion that regional organizations generally are likely to act
effectively in collective self-defense. The American repub-
lics have a longer history of association and cooperation
than do most other regional arrangements and their ties are
generally stronger. That it acted collectively in this
specific instance of danger should not be generalized into
an assumption that other organizations would act similarly
in such circumstances. Given these reservations as to the






the Cuban crisis constituted a valid example of collective
action by a regional organisation undertaken in self-defense.
It is far from an indication that the regional approach is
infallible, but it does illustrate the fact that such organi-
sations, because of geographical proximity and common inter-
ests, can in some circumstances be a useful alternative to
other approaches to security* Since the regional approach
is necessarily the result of a consensus among the states
concerned, it can be expected that its actions will gener-
ally have bomn more thoroughly reasoned and should, there-
fore, be less subject to the abuses of the exaggeration of
necessity and excess in the means of response. As one of
the many available approaches to the quest for international
order, regional action in collective self-defense should
have a useful place in our means for seeking solutions to
threatening situations.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is proposed that a realistic doc-
trine of the right of self-defense must take note of a
number of relevant factors. First and of primary importance,
the doctrine must be consistent with the purposes it is in-
tended to serve. In order for this to be possible, it must
recognise the nature of the international legal and politi-
cal system and the probability that states will be required









maintain their security and political independence* Finally,
this doctrine should be consistent with the desire and ef-
fort eventually to subordinate the unilateral use of force
in international relations to the institutionalised regula-
tion of force in a manner which will ensure the peace and
security of all nations through the rule of international
law*
The analysis of the Cuban quarantine in terms of the
law of self-defens* has shown that the law is essentially
unchanged f insofar as the right to apply it and the extent
to which it justifies the use of force are concerned* since
the classic formulation of its terms by Daniel Webster in
the last century* The changes in its concept have been
largely a matter of the transformation in the nature of the
factors which constitute the necessity for its being re-
sorted to* The law of the United Nations Charter altered
the concept of the law only by providing procedures which
could, in some cases, offer alternatives of peaceful settle-
ment or collective security and apparently by limiting the
legal bases for resort to force* It is doubtful if the
latter was actually a modification in the concept since it
is unlikely that any resort to force which is in violation
of the Charter could have been a legitimate act of self-
defense*




Application of the right of self-defense is necessarily
framed in general terms. Man has not yet been able to agree
on a workable legal definition of self-defense, or of
aggression, and he is not likely to be able to do so, mainly
for the reason that the distinction between the two is a
matter of circumstances and the degree and type of force
employed. While it is probably impossible to define exactly
the term "necessary self-defense," it is not necessarily
impossible to determine subjectively whether a specific case
falls within its permissible limits.
It is suggested that the following be constituents of
this doctrine for the application of the legal right of
self-defense:
1. The reasonable need, "as third-party observers
18
may determine reasonableness," for an immediate use of
force in the self-protection of a state's territorial integ-
rity, political independence, and national security;
2. The use of force in a measure and to the extent
proportional to the danger raised; and
3* The subsequent determination of the validity of
the claim to a reasonable need and of the proportionality of
the force employed by an impartial authority so empowered.
It is considered that such a doctrine fully complies
18
McDougal, o£. cit




with the present rules of international law applicable to
the right of self--defense*
The third of these constituents is obviously the one
most unlikely to be realised in the present international
quasi-order, but it is the one most essential to the preven-
tion of the entire concept's being abused. The shortcomings
of our system in this respect have already been discussed,
but it is in order to reiterate the great need for its im-
provement.
The desire to curb the right of resort to force in
international relations is a worthy one, but the right of
self-defense must be retained in an effective form until
after the ability to resort to force illegally has been
effectively denied. The right is open to the possibility of
grave abuse, but nothing would be solved by denying it.
Only the moral state would be punished. An aggressor may
occasionally misuse the plea of necessary self-defense; but
if no such right were allowed, he would not thereby be
deterred.
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INTERDICTION OF THE DELIVERY OF OFFENSIVE
WEAPONS TO CUBA A PROCLAMATION1
WHEREAS the peace of the world and the security of
the United States and of all American States are endangered
by reason of the establishment by the Sino-Soviet powers of
an offensive military capability in Cuba, including bases
for ballistic missiles with a potential range covering most
of North and South America;
WHEREAS by a Joint Resolution passed by the Congress
of the United States and approved on October 3, 1962, it was
declared that the United States is determined to prevent by
whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms,
the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force
or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activi-
ties to any part of this hemisphere, and to prevent in Cuba
the creation or use of an externally supported military
capability endangering the security of the United States} and
WHEREAS the Organ of Consultation of the American
Republics meeting in Washington on October 23, 1962, recom-
mended that the Member States, in accordance with Article 6
and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,





take all measures, individually and collectively, including
the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to en-
sure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive
from the Sino-ooviet powers military material and related
supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the
Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive
capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace
and security of the Continent:
WOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN P. KENNEDY, President of the
United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the
authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and statutes
of the United States, in accordance with the aforementioned
resolutions of the United States Congress and of the Organ
of Consultation of the American Republics, and to defend the
security of the United States, do hereby proclaim that the
forces under my command are ordered, beginning at 2:00 p.m.
Greenwich time October 24, 1962, to interdict, subject to
the instructions herein contained, the delivery of offensive
weapons and associated materiel to Cuba.
For the purposes of this Proclamation, the following
are declared to be prohibited materiel:
Surface-to-surface missiles; bomber aircraft; bombs;
air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any
of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to






materiel hereafter designated by the Secretary of Defense
for the purpose of effectuating this Proclamation.
To enforce this order, the Secretary of Defense shall
take appropriate measures to prevent the delivery of pro*
hibited materiel to Cuba, employing the land, sea and air
forces of the United States in cooperation with any forces
that may be made available by other American States*
The Secretary of Defense may make such regulations
and issue such directives as he deems necessary to ensure
the effectiveness of this order, including the designation,
within a reasonable distance of Cuba, of prohibited or re-
stricted sones and of prescribed routes.
Any vessel or craft which may be proceeding toward
Cuba may be intercepted and may be directed to identify it-
self, its cargo, equipment and stores and its ports of call,
to stop, to lie to, to submit to visit and search, or to
proceed as directed. Any vessel or craft which fails or
refuses to respond to or comply with directions shall be
subject to being taken into custody. Any vessel or craft
which it is believed is en route to Cuba and may be carrying
prohibited materiel or may itself constitute such materiel
shall, wherever possible, be directed to proceed to another
destination of its own choice and shall be taken into custody
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or craft taken into custody shall be sent into a port of the
United States for appropriate disposition.
In carrying out this order, force shall not be used
except in case of failure or refusal to comply with direc-
tions, or with regulations or directives of the Secretary of
Defense issued hereunder, after reasonable efforts have been
made to communicate them to the vessel or craft, or in case
of self-defense. In any case, force shall be used only to
the extent necessary.
IN WITNESS thereof, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.
DONE in the City of Washington this twenty-third day
of October in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and
sixty-two, and of the Independence of the United States of















TEXT OF OAS RESOLUTION1
WHEREAS,
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of
1947 (Rio Treaty) recognises the obligation of the American
Republics to "provide for effective reciprocal assistance to
meet armed attacks against any American state and in order
to deal with threats of aggression against any of them"
Article 6 of the said Treaty states:
"If the inviolability or the integrity of the terri-
tory or the sovereignty or political independence of any
American State should be affected by an aggression which is
not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-
continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that
might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consulta-
tion shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures
which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the vic-
tim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which
should be taken for the common defense and for the main-
tenance of the peace and security of the Continent •'*
Adopted by the Council on October 23, 1962, by a
vote of 19 to 0, with 1 abstention (Uruguay abstained on
October 23 because its delegate had not received instruc-
tions from his Government} on October 24, Uruguay cast an
affirmative vote, making approval of the resolution unani-
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The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics in Punta del
Este in January, 1962, agreed in Resolution II "to urge the
member states to take those steps that they may consider
appropriate for their individual and collective self-defense,
and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to
strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or acts of
aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and secu-
rity resulting from the continued intervention in this
hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with the
obligations established in treaties and agreements such as
the Charter of the Organisation of American States and the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance'*}
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American
Republics meeting informally in Washington, October 2 and 3,
1962, reasserted "the firm Intention of the Governments
represented and of the peoples of the American Republics to
conduct themselves in accordance with the principles of the
regional system, staunchly sustaining and consolidating the
principles of the Charter of the Organisation of American
States, and affirmed the will to strengthen the security of
the hemisphere against all aggression from within or outside
the Hemisphere and against all developments or situations
capable of threatening the peace and security of the Hemi-







of Reciprocal Assistance of Rio de Janeiro* It was the view
of the Ministers that the existing organizations and bodies
of the Inter-American system should intensify the carrying
out of their respective duties with special and urgent
attention to the situation created by the communist regime
in Cuba and that they should stand in readiness to consider
the matter promptly if the situation requires measures beyond
those already authorized,"
The same meeting "recalled that the Soviet Union 1 s
intervention in Cuba threatens the unity of the Americas and
its democratic institutions, and that this intervention has
special characteristics which, pursuant to paragraph 3 of
Resolution II of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, call for the adoption of
special measures, both individual and collective";
Incontrovertible evidence has appeared that the
Government of Cuba, despite repeated warnings, has secretly
endangered the peace of the Continent by permitting the
Sino-Soviet powers to have intermediate and middle-range
missiles on its territory capable of carrying nuclear war-
heads!
THE Council of the Organization of American States,
Meeting as the Provisional Organ of Consultation, RESOLVES*
1. To call for the immediate dismantling and with-





2* To recommend that the member states, in accord-
ance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and
collectively, including the use of armed force, which they
may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba
cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers mili-
tary material and related supplies which may threaten the
peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the mis-
siles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming
an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent;
3* To inform the Security Council of the United
Nations of this resolution in accordance with Article 54 of
the Charter of the United Nations and to express the hope
that the Security Council will, in accordance with the draft
resolution introduced by the United States, dispatch United
Nations observers to Cuba at the earliest moment;
4. To continue to serve provisionally as Organ of
Consultation and to request the Member States to keep the
Organ of Consultation duly informed of measures taken by
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